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Abstract
Valuable information, such as user authentication credentials and per-
sonal sensitive information, can be obtained by exploiting vulnerabilities
within the user’s understanding of a system, and particularly a lack of
understanding of the user interface.
As the barrier to exploiting system vulnerabilities has increased signific-
antly with time, attacking users has rapidly become a more efficient and
effective alternative.
To protect users from phishing attacks system designers and security
professionals need to understand how users interact with those attacks.
In this thesis I present an improved understanding of the interaction and
three novel mechanisms to defend against phishing attacks.
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Introduction
This chapter describes what phishing attacks are and why it is so import-
ant that we must defend against them effectively. It also explains why
by improving our understanding of the users’ psychological models and
fundamentals of phishing attacks, more effective countermeasures can be
inspired.
1.1 What is a Phishing Attack?
While the Internet has brought unprecedented convenience to many
people for managing their finances and investments, it also provides
opportunities for conducting fraud on a massive scale with little cost to the
fraudsters. Fraudsters can manipulate users instead of hardware/software
systems, where barriers to technological compromise have increased
significantly. Phishing is one of the most widely practised Internet frauds.
It focuses on the theft of sensitive personal information such as passwords
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
and credit card details. Phishing attacks take two forms:
• attempts to deceive victims to cause them to reveal their secrets
by pretending to be trustworthy entities with a real need for such
information;
• attempts to obtain secrets by planting malware onto victims’ ma-
chines.
The specific malware used in phishing attacks is subject of research by
the virus and malware community and is not addressed in this thesis.
Phishing attacks that proceed by deceiving users are the research focus of
this thesis and the term ‘phishing attack’ will be used to refer to this type
of attack.
Despite numerous countermeasure efforts, the scale and sophistication
of phishing attacks are still increasing. The number of reported phishing
web sites increased 50 percent from January 2008 to January 2010 [73].
During the 2008 world financial crisis phishing attack incidents increased
three times compared to the same period in 2007. The real figure could
be much higher because many sophisticated phishing attacks (such as
context aware phishing attacks, malware based phishing attacks, and
real-time man-in-the-middle phishing attacks against one-time passwords
[79]) may not all have been captured and reported. Victims of these
phishing attacks may never realise they have been attacked, and many of
these sophisticated attacks are targeted and small scale, hence it is likely
many of them will not have been captured and reported.
2
1.1 What is a Phishing Attack?
Phishing attacks have not only caused significant financial damage to both
users and companies/financial organizations, but also have damaged
users’ confidence in e–commerce as a whole. According to Gartner
analysts, financial losses stemming from phishing attacks rose to more
than 3.2 billion USD with 3.6 million victims in 2007 in the US [60], and
consumer anxiety about Internet security resulted in a two billion USD
loss in e–commerce and banking transactions in 2006 [58]. In the United
Kingdom losses from web banking frauds (mostly from phishing) almost
doubled to $46m in 2005, from $24m in 2004, while 1 in 20 computer
users claimed to have lost out to phishing in 2005 [60]. 1
As the Internet continues to transform how people manage their data,
complete their business tasks, and share resources, the value of user
authentication credentials to access those services will increase. Phishing
attacks may compromise the integrity of such valuable authentication
credentials, and must be defended against effectively and efficiently.
From the victim’s point of view, a phishing attack can be broken down
into three stages:
1. Attacker approach: the approach by attackers on a chosen commu-
nication channel;
2. Interaction: interaction with the fraudulent entity which imperson-
ates its legitimate counterpart;
3. Exploitation: exploitation of the obtained secret information for
financial gain.
1These figures are the latest version author can obtain on 1st June 2010.
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A typical phishing attack would engage victims via emails, then lead
them to a phishing website. Attackers can either directly use the obtained
user authentication credentials to raid victims’ financial assets, or sell
them to other criminals. Here I describe a real-life phishing attack to
illustrate how phishing works.
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [73] and Phishtank [74] collect
and archive a large number of reported phishing attacks. An example
from Phishtank is an attack against HBOS bank customers on 15th January
2009. It happened during the banking crisis when the HBOS banking
group was about to be taken over by Lloyds TSB banking group.
In stage one: the potential victims received an email (shown in Fig-
ure 1.1), which claimed to be from HBOS, asking customers to check how
the acquisition would affect their bank accounts and update personal
information if necessary through the provided hypertext link.
In stage two: if users believed they were interacting with a legitimate
email and followed the provided hypertext link, they would give away
their authentication credentials to the phishing website (shown in Fig-
ure 1.2).
In stage three: the attackers would sell the authentication credentials
to others or directly use them to transfer money away from victims’
accounts.
HBOS customers could very easily be deceived by this phishing email.
At the time the acquisition was widely reported by public media and the
deal was set to be concluded on 19th January 2009. As a result HBOS
customers might well have expected such communications. RBS is one of
4
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Figure 1.1: Phishing Email Screen Shot
5
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Figure 1.2: Phishing Website Screen Shot
6
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the banks owned by the HBOS group. In addition, the action suggested
in this email might seem both rational and professional. The email header
also suggests it is from RBS – the ‘From’ field is no-reply@rbs.co.uk.
The hypertext links in the emails except the one leading to the phishing
website all link to the legitimate Lloyds TSB website. The phishing
website has been carefully prepared to have the same style and layout as
the legitimate Lloyds TSB website, and all the hypertext links are linked
to the legitimate website. Only users who carefully examine the domain
name of the website would discover they are visiting a phishing website;
the digits ‘11’ (one one) look very similar to the letters ‘ll’ at a glance.
Users do not know when they will be attacked. To avoid falling victim to
this attack, users must either analyse the IP address from which an email
is actually sent from or consistently check very carefully the URL strings
of the hypertext links.
1.2 The Thesis
1.2.1 Statement and the Interpretation of the Hypothesis
The thesis is:
A more refined understanding of the nature of deception in phishing
attacks would facilitate more effective user-centred threat identifica-
tion of web based authentication systems, the development of coun-
termeasures to identified threats, and the production of guidelines for
phishing–resilient system designs.
7
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This thesis is an example of multi-disciplinary research where human
computer interaction and security meet. Essentially a phishing attack
aims to engineer a false perception within a victim’s mind. Having
had a false perception constructed in his mind the victim will carry out
actions to satisfy the attacker’s goals. To defend against such attacks
effectively and efficiently, an understanding of how human users interact
with phishing attacks at the user interface and how users perceive the
information presented at the interface to form the mental model is vital.
Some user studies [21, 77, 26, 50, 46, 88] have investigated human factors,
but greater insights are still needed.
An improved understanding of human computer interaction in this do-
main can aid both prevention and detection of phishing attacks. In the
prevention area, the knowledge can help system designers choose user
interfaces that help users form accurate mental models, and hence make
appropriate decisions; the knowledge can also be used to analyse an
authentication system for the vulnerabilities that attackers might exploit
to carry out phishing attacks (existing threat modelling techniques do not
address the phishing threat, because they do not consider usability of the
system and their human factors). This knowledge could also be applied
to design detection systems that are easier for users to understand while
being much harder for attackers to bypass.
This thesis will demonstrate that all above claims can be achieved. There
are three target audiences for the research reported here: the anti-phishing
research community, system designers who design and implement user
interfaces for authentication systems, and security practitioners who
analyse existing systems and provide security education for end users.
8
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1.2.2 Research Method
Overall the work described in this thesis follows a constructive research
approach. The research started with studying literature bodies of: social
engineering, phishing attack techniques, human factors in phishing at-
tacks, and phishing attacks countermeasures. The author concluded that
more research to understand how users make decisions during phishing
attack interactions was needed. Users’ decision making plays a vital role
in deciding the outcome of a phishing attack. With better understanding
in this area, more effective countermeasures could be discovered.
In the next phase of the research cognitive walkthroughs [13] were used to
study a large number of social engineering and phishing attack incidents.
Drawing on the findings of the walkthoughs, a user-phishing interaction
model was constructed.
The knowledge obtained in the first two phases of the research formed
the base for the final phase of the research – creating more effective
phishing attacks prevention and detection methods. The author proposed
a threat modelling method to identify threats that can be realised by
attacking users of authentication systems. To demonstrate the merits
of the method, it is applied to study two widely used authentication
systems. The user-phishing interaction model suggests users, who fall
victims to phishing attacks, construct false perceptions in their minds
and subsequently carry out actions to release sensitive information to
attackers. The false perceptions and subsequent actions are common to
most, if not all, phishing attacks. This inspired the creation of a detection
technique which ignores how phishing attacks are presented, but rather
focuses on users’ actions to release sensitive information to parties to
9
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whom such sensitive information has never been released before. The
findings in the first two phases of the research have also influenced the
design decisions relating to the usability of this detection system. The
detection accuracy (including false positives) of the detection system is
also evaluated.
1.3 Major Contributions
The major contributions this thesis makes are:
User Phishing Interaction Model: a psychological model to capture the
general process of decision making during user-phishing interac-
tion and important factors that can influence the outcome of such
decision making. It is useful for designing security tools/indicators,
evaluating how well a phishing detection tool can assist users to
detect phishing attacks, and designing effective and efficient user
education methods.
Threat Modelling methods for Web Authentication Systems: a framework and
related methods to identify and assess user-related vulnerabilities
within internet based user authentication systems.
User Behaviour Based Phishing Attacks Detection System: a novel phish-
ing website detection approach and its prototype.
10
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1.4 Brief Overview of the Chapters
The subsequent chapters of this thesis are as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews existing publications in the fields of understanding
human factors in phishing attacks, phishing detection systems, and
social engineering/semantic attacks in general. It also identifies
gaps in existing work.
Chapter 3 describes a model to capture essential characteristics within
user–phishing–attack interactions, and describes the applications of
this model.
Chapter 4 introduces a new method to systematically analyse potential
vulnerabilities that exist in web-based authentication systems. It
also presents two case studies to demonstrate the merit of this
method.
Chapter 5 describes the design, implementation and evaluation of UBPD –
a phishing website detection system. The detection system is based
on past user behaviours and it is much harder to bypass than most
current detection systems.
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and its contributions and also points out
areas where future research could be conducted.
11
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Chapter 2
Introduction to Social Engineering and
Phishing attacks
This chapter provides an introduction to social engineering and phish-
ing attack techniques, and reviews related human factors studies and
techniques to counter phishing attacks.
2.1 Overview
The research literature reviewed in this chapter can be classified into the
following four categories:
1. understanding of attacks (both social engineering attacks in general
and phishing attacks in particular);
2. bounded rationality decision making theory;
13
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3. investigation of human factors in security; and
4. techniques to prevent and detect phishing attacks.
2.2 Understanding of Attacks
2.2.1 Social Engineering/Semantic Attacks
Social engineering (SE) attacks generally achieve their goals by manipulat-
ing victims to execute actions against their interests. This term typically
applies to trickery or deception for the purpose of information gathering,
fraud or gaining computing system access. Phishing attacks are a subset
of social engineering attacks.
Kevin Mitnick, who acquired millions of dollars by carrying out social
engineering attacks, is arguably the best known social engineering at-
tacker. His book "The art of deception: Controlling the Human Element
of Security" [65] defined social engineering as follows:
Using influence and persuasion to deceive people by con-
vincing them that the attacker is someone he is not, or by
manipulation. As a result, the social engineer is able to take
advantage of people to obtain information, or to persuade
them to perform an action item, with or without the use of
technology.
There is no commonly accepted definition for the term “ Social Engin-
14
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eering”. Mitnick’s definition has considerable appeal 1. It highlights that
people are the major target of attack, indicates some of the important tools
used by attackers, such as influence and persuasion, and summarises the
objectives of the attack. But this definition does not address why people
can be so easily deceived, and does not provide a fundamental structure
or model for SE attacks. Moreover, the objectives of SE in his description
are not comprehensive.
Mitnick’s book has four parts. Part 1 introduces the basic elements of
social engineering. Parts 2 and 3 use a lot of “fictional” stories and
phone transcripts to show how an attacker can manipulate employees
into revealing seemingly innocent pieces of information that are later used
(sometimes on an ongoing basis) to extend the confidence trick, gain more
access, steal information, “borrow” company resources, and otherwise
defraud companies or individuals out of just about anything. The stories
are very basic examples of social engineering that are designed to raise
awareness. The majority of the tactics described focus on impersonating
someone who should have legitimate access to the data, but for one
reason or another cannot get to it. The attacker then enlists the aid of a
helpful but unsuspecting employee to retrieve the information for them.
In many cases, this is a process that involves a number of employees,
all of whom provide small bits of seemingly unimportant information
that become pieces in a large puzzle. He also analyses the attacks from
1 Other definitions: "The art and science of getting people to comply to your wishes" –
Harl "People hacking"[39]; "social engineering is the process of deceiving people into
giving confidential, private or privileged information or access to a hacker." –Rusch,
Jonathan J. [76]; "social engineering is generally a hacker’s clever manipulation of the
natural human tendency to trust. The hacker’s goal is to obtain information that will
allow him/her to gain unauthorized access to a valued system and the information
that resides on that system." – Sarah Granger[34, 35]
15
Chapter 2 Introduction to Social Engineering and Phishing attacks
both the attacker’s and victim’s perspective and offers advice on how
to protect against similar attacks. In Part 4 Mitnick provides a number
of sample security policies and procedures, including data classification
categories, verification and authentication procedures, guidelines for
awareness training, methods of identifying social engineering attacks,
warning signs, and flowcharts for responding to requests for information
or action. The majority of policies and procedures are not novel and are
largely based on the ideas suggested by Charles Cresson Wood [15].
Many publications [33, 34, 35, 36, 59] on SE have summarised the tech-
niques SE uses and the media through which SE is conducted. A few
of them have tried to classify SE attacks. One of the best known clas-
sifications of SE is given by Sarah Granger [34, 35]. It partitions social
engineering into the following five categories:
1. Social engineering by phone. (Telephone communication);
2. Dumpster diving. (Office waste);
3. Online social engineering. (The Internet);
4. Persuasion. (Face to face communication); and
5. Reverse social engineering
It classifies SE based on the techniques rather than the nature of the
attacks. The first four categories are based on the communication medium
used to convey SE. (The communication medium is given in parentheses
above). The last category is a special case of SE using scenarios where
16
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the victim is the party who initiates the communication. In such a case
the victim will be much easier to deceive, because they initiated the
communication and they will likely trust the attacker more. Others
[33, 59] have chosen to classify SE by targets of attacks, or by tools or
techniques used by the attacks.
All these classifications are useful for introducing SE. However, they
do not reveal the nature of SE nor provide any insights of why SE
works. We might expect those existing classifications to fail to cover
new attacks as SE evolves, especially when new SE attacks use different
communication media, or are different in appearance. For example,
the USB SE attacks [20] do not fit into Granger’s classification. Most
importantly such classifications cannot directly be applied to facilitate
proactive SE detection and guide the design of SE resilient systems.
Existing classifications view social engineering from the attacker’s point
of view. They are useful to define what SE is, and serve as a tutorial about
how SE attacks are executed. But they are less useful when it comes to
help identify SE attacks, improve the security of the system at the design
stage, and contribute to automated detection solutions.
2.2.2 Phishing Attacks
Phishing is a special type of social engineering attack. In his phishing
attacks guides [70, 69] Ollmann has described the anatomy of phishing
attacks and surveyed phishing attack prevention techniques. He described
phishing attack threats from the following three aspects:
• social engineering factors;
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• how phishing messages are delivered to victims via email, web, IRC,
instant messenger, and trojan horses;
• techniques used in phishing attacks such as man-in-the-middle
attacks, URL Obfuscation, cross site scripting, preset session attacks,
etc.
In his report he also provides detailed advice on how to use existing
technologies to counter phishing threats from both client and server sides
as well as on what organisations can do to prevent them. He identifies
the following countermeasures that can be applied on the client side:
1. desktop protection technologies;
2. utilisation of appropriate, less sophisticated communication settings;
3. user application-level monitoring solutions;
4. locking-down browser capabilities;
5. digital signing and validation of email; and
6. improving general security awareness.
He also identifies the following countermeasures that can be applied on
the server side:
1. improving customer awareness;
2. providing validation information for official communications;
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3. ensuring that Internet web applications are securely developed and
doesn’t include easily exploitable attack vectors;
4. using strong token-based authentication systems; and
5. keeping naming systems simple and understandable.
Finally he also suggests businesses and ISP’s should use technologies
to protect against phishing attacks at the enterprise-level. The following
enterprise solutions are suggested:
1. automatic validation of sending email server addresses;
2. digital signing of email services;
3. monitoring of corporate domains and notification of “similar” re-
gistrations;
4. perimeter or gateway protection agents; and
5. third-party managed services.
Together with the counter-measure mechanisms on both client and server
sides, phishing attacks can be defended effectively at multiple levels,
giving better protection to users.
Watson et al. have carried out a study to observe real phishing attacks
in the wild by using Honeynet [84]. This study focuses on how attackers
build, use and maintain their infrastructure of hacked systems. The report
19
Chapter 2 Introduction to Social Engineering and Phishing attacks
is based on data collected by the German Honeynet Project and the UK
Honeynet Project. They do not cover all possible phishing methods or
techniques, focussing instead on describing the follow three techniques
observed:
1. phishing through compromised web servers;
2. phishing through port redirection; and
3. phishing using botnets.
They also briefly describe how the observed attacks transfer money they
have stolen from victims’ bank accounts. Their work provides some
insights into how phishing attacks are implemented in reality.
To formally understand the phishing attack from the technical point of
view, Jacobsson has introduced a method to describe a variety of phishing
attacks in a uniform and compact manner via a graphical model [47]. He
has also presented an overview of potential system vulnerabilities and
corresponding defence mechanisms.
In such a graph, there are two types of vertices; those cor-
responding to access to some information; and those corres-
ponding to access to some resource. Actions are represented
as edges in the graph. Two vertices are connected by an edge
if there is an action that would allow an adversary with ac-
cess corresponding to one of the vertices to establish access
corresponding to the other of the vertices. Some set of nodes
correspond to possible starting states of attackers, where the
state contains all information available to the attacker. (This
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A graphical representation. Let us now see how we can represent this attack using a phishing
graph. In figure 4, vertex v1 corresponds to knowledge of the name of the administrative contact
of a domain to be attacked. Vertex v2 corresponds to knowledge of the appropriate credit card
number, and vertex v3 to access to the account. Finally, v4 corresponds to knowledge of a service
for which a user in the attacked domain is registered as the administrative contact, and where
passwords are emailed to administrators claiming to have forgotten the passwords, and v5 to access
to the account of such a site. There is an edge e12 corresponding to the action of finding out credit
card numbers associated with a person with a given name. Edge e23 corresponds to the action
of using the correct credit card number to authenticate to the site, and edge e345 to requesting a
forgotten password to be emailed. Note that both v3 and v5 may be considered target nodes.
v
1
v
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3
v
4
v
5
e
12
e
23
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345
Figure 4: A simplified graphical representation of a man-in-the-middle attack on a domain name
server. A detailed representation would also have labels on edges corresponding to effort, proba-
bility, and other costs.
Remark: Another common approach to deal with forgotten passwords is to rely on so-called
security questions. This is, for example, used at PayPal, where the four possible questions relate
to the mother’s maiden name; city of birth; last four digits of social security number; and last four
digits of drivers license number. The mother’s maiden name of a person can be obtained from
publicly available documents and services, using a set of clever queries. For example, if a woman
has one name when moving to a given address, and another name when moving out, then chances
are that the first name is her maiden name, and it would be clear what the mother’s maiden name
of any of her children is. Consecutive records linking names to addresses or other stable pieces of
information can be obtained from records of memberships to organizations, mortgage documents,
voters registration records, marriage licences, public litigation files, and other publicly available
services, such as [7].. Such records may also be used to determine with a good likelihood the city
of birth of a person: by knowing the names of his or her parents, and determining where they lived
at the time of the victim’s birth. A person’s social security number can often be obtained from
records of types similar to those from which mothers maiden names can be derived. In addition, if
a user enters the answers to any of these questions at a rogue site (for the same purposes: password
security questions) then this site has immediate access to the information.
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[47]
may simply consist of publicly available information.) One
node corresponds to access to so e resource of the attacker’s
choosing, call this the target node. Fo n attack to be suc-
cessful, there needs to be a path from a starting state to the
target node. Figure 2.1 illustrates the graphical model for a
man-in-a-middle phishing attack.
An explanation [47] for the model illustrated in Figure 2.1 is given be-
low:
vertex v1 corresponds to knowledge of the name of the
administrative contact of a domain to be attacked. Vertex
v2 corresponds to knowledge of the appropriate credit card
number, and vertex v3 to access to the account. Finally, v4
corresponds to knowledge of a service for which a user in the
attacked domain is registered as the administrative contact,
and where passwords are emailed to administrators claiming
to have forgotten the passwords, and v5 to access to the ac-
count of such a site. There is an edge e12 corresponding to the
action of finding out credit card numbers associated with a
person with a given name. Edge e23 corresponds to the action
21
Chapter 2 Introduction to Social Engineering and Phishing attacks

02/#%33 &,/7 /& ! 0()3().' !44!#+
4HE PHISHING PROCESS IS EASILY REPRESENTED IN A mOWCHART SHOWING THE INPUT REQUIRED FROM DIF
FERENT PLAYERS AT VARIOUS STAGES %ACH STEP INVOLVES SPECIALIZED SKILLS FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE 
INTERNET COMMUNITY
0LANNING
4HE PLANNING STAGE REQUIRES INFORMATION TO BE COLLECTEDSUCH AS TARGET EnMAIL LISTS AND SCAM 
PAGE TEMPLATES AND REQUIRES KNOWLEDGE FROM CONSUMERS OF PHISHING CREDENTIALS
$ETAILED INFORMATION SUCH AS TARGET EMAIL LISTS AND SCAM PAGE TEMPLATES NEEDS TO BE COLLECT
ED 4HE PHISHER DOES NOT NEED TO BE ADEPT AT WEB DESIGN BUT INSTEAD CAN SIMPLY OBTAIN A SCAM 
PAGE ALREADY DESIGNED OR USED 3CAM PAGES AND EnMAIL TEMPLATES ARE WIDELY AVAILABLE WITHIN 
THE COMMUNITY )F MORE ADVANCED TEMPLATE TECHNIQUES ARE PREFERRED SKILLED WEB DESIGNERS 
WHO ADVERTISE ON KNOWN FRAUDRELATED FORUMS ARE AVAILABLE FOR HIRE
4HE TRADE OF COMPROMISED COMPUTERS ALSO KNOWN AS 2OOTS IS A THRIVING ECONOMY #OMPUTERS 
ARE EASILY COMPROMISED THROUGH VARIOUS PUBLIC EXPLOITS AND 4ROJANS USING SECURITY HOLES IN 
NETWORK SOFTWARE 4HE SECURITY COMMUNITY READILY PROVIDES PROOFOFCONCEPT EXPLOITS THAT CAN 
BE USED TO GAIN ACCESS TO VULNERABLE COMPUTERS SO THERE IS A CONSTANT SUPPLY OF COMPROMISED 
HOSTS 0HISHERS DO NOT NEED THE TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO COMPROMISE HOSTS INSTEAD THEY 
CAN PURCHASE ACCESS TO COMPROMISED HOSTS FROM HACKERS
3ETUP
4HE NEXT STEP INVOLVES ENSURING THAT THE PROPER SCAM PAGE INFRASTRUCTURE EXISTS ON THE COM
PROMISED HOSTS BEING CONSIDERED FOR THE PHISHING ATTACK
Figure 2.2: Phishing Attacks From Start To Finish [6]
of using the correct credit card number to authenticate to the
site, and edge e345 to requesting a forgotten password to be
emailed. Note that both v3 and v5 may be considered target
nodes
Although the model can be consistently applied to describe phishing
attacks, it offers little value in helping understand why phishing attacks
work and how to prevent and detect them.
Abad has studied the flow of phishing attacks from an economics point of
view[6]. He derived the reported results by analysing 3,900,000 phishing e-
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mails and 220,000 messages. The data was collected from 13 key phishing-
related chat rooms and 48,000 users which were spread across six chat
networks and 4,400 compromised hosts used in botnets. He concludes
that phishing attacks from the attackers’ point of view have five stages:
planning, setup, attack, collection, and cashing. (The graphical model
is illustrated in Figure 2.2.) He also discovered that phishing attacks
are organized and well co-ordinated with participants having specific
roles to play. These participants serve each other by exchanging services
or information for cash and their behaviours follow the laws of supply
and demand. Using the model presented by this study, one can clearly
understand the sophistication of phishing attacks. The model could also
be useful for identifying points where intervention could be made to
prevent phishing attacks from succeeding.
In-Session Phishing Attacks
The phishing attacks which have been described so far all need to actively
engage users via a communication channel. In–session phishing [54], a
more recently reported type of attack, uses a more passive mode, and yet
is still very effective.
This type of attack exploits user’s opening of multiple web pages at
the same time. It can succeed if the users have logged into one of the
websites which the attacker would like to impersonate and have opened
a web page from a compromised website. On the compromised website
the attacker plants malware to identify which website the victim user is
currently logged on to, then the malware presents a dialogue box, which
asks the user to retype their user name and password because the session
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has expired, or complete a customer satisfaction survey, or participate in
a promotion, etc. Since the user had recently logged onto the targeted
website, he/she is unlikely to suspect this pop-up is fraudulent and thus
is likely to provide the requested details.
Identifying websites to which a user is currently logged onto can be
more difficult to achieve. Jeremiah Grossman et al. have described a
method to detect the stage of authentication by loading images that are
only accessible to logged-in users [19]. There are other methods that can
achieve this by exploiting vulnerabilities within web browsers. However,
those methods are not general. In Section 2.4.1, a general method is
described.
2.3 Bounded Rationality
Phishing attacks achieve their goals when users have been deceived to
carry out certain actions. It is certainly against users’ interests to satisfy
attackers’ goals. However, they still decide to do so. If human behaviour
can be understood as a purposeful attempt to achieve well-being, then
why would phishing attack victims make such decisions?
Bounded rationality [80] is the decision making theory proposed by
Herbert Alexander Simon. Simon suggested that decision-makers arrive
at their decisions by rationally applying the information and resources
that are easily available to them, with the consequence that satisfactory
rather than optimal decisions result.
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Bounded rationality theory has great value for understanding why users
make certain decisions during their interactions with phishing attacks.
It recognises that in practice rational decisions are often impossible and
users’ rationality is limited by information available to them. In phsihing
attacks, rationality of users could be strongly limited by the information
presented to them at the user interface. It also recognises that the time
available to decision makers and their own cognitive ability are limiting
factors. In Simon’s theory, the cost of gathering and processing the in-
formation would also greatly influence the rationality of a decision one
made. It would be interesting to apply the principles of bounded rational-
ity to understand user victims’ decision making during interactions with
phishing attacks.
2.4 Human Factors
In phishing attacks human users are the targets of attack. To be able
to provide them with appropriate warning messages and design secure
usable interfaces, understanding why they fall victim and how they
behave in cyberspace is essential.
Dhamija et al. have investigated why users fall victim to phishing attacks
by carrying out a controlled phishing attack user study [21]. In this study
20 web sites were presented in no particular order to 22 participants. The
participants were asked to determine which websites they visited were
fraudulent, and to provide rationales. They identified three major causes
for victimhood:
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1. a lack of understanding of how computer systems work. Many users
lack underlying knowledge of how operating systems, applications,
email and the web work and how to distinguish among these;
2. a lack of attention to security indicators or the absence of security
indicators; and
3. the high quality visual deception practised by the phishers.
The highly controlled nature of this study may lead to biased conclusions
or failure to identify important factors in why phishing works. In the
experiment, users’ attention is directed to making a decision regarding
the authenticity of the web-sites. However, in a real-world setting, users
would have a range of tasks they wish to perform and establishing
authenticity of any accessed websites might not be a primary concern.
Schechter et al. evaluated website authentication measures that are de-
signed to protect users from phishing attacks [77]. 67 bank customers
were asked to conduct common online banking tasks. Each time they
logged in, they were presented with increasingly alarming clues that
their connection was insecure. First, HTTPS indicators were removed;
second, the participant’s site-authentication image (the customer-selected
image that many websites now expect their users to verify before entering
their passwords) were removed; finally, the bank’s password-entry page
was replaced with a warning page. After each clue, researchers then
checked whether participants entered their passwords or withheld them.
The researchers also investigated how a study’s design affects participant
behaviour: they asked some participants to play specially created user
roles and others to use their own accounts and passwords. Their major
findings are:
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1. users will enter their passwords even when HTTPS indicators are
absent;
2. users will enter their passwords even if site authentication images
are absent;
3. site-authentication images may cause users to disregard other im-
portant security indicators; and
4. role-playing participants behaved significantly less securely than
those using their own passwords.
Again because of the experiment conditions, there could be an overestim-
ate of the ineffectiveness of the security indicators.
Egelman et al. examine the effectiveness of web browsers’ phishing
warnings and examine if, how, and why they fail users [26]. In their study
they used a spear phishing attack to expose users to browser warnings.
97% of sixty participants fell for at least one of the phishing messages
sent to them; 79% of participants paid attention to an active warning, in
contrast only one participant noticed a passive warning. Egelman et al.
also applied the C-HIP model [86] (Figure 2.3) from the warning sciences
to analyse how users perceive warning messages and suggest:
1. interrupting the primary task: phishing indicators need to be de-
signed to interrupt the user’s task;
2. providing clear choices: phishing indicators need to provide the
user with clear options on how to proceed, rather than simply
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displaying a block of text;
3. failing safely: phishing indicators must be designed such that one
can only proceed to the phishing website after reading the warning
message;
4. preventing habituation: phishing indicators need to be distinguish-
able from less serious warnings and used only when there is a clear
danger; and
5. altering the phishing website: phishing indicators need to distort
the look and feel of the website such that the user does not place
trust in it.
The suggestions made by Egelman et al. are very useful indeed, however,
their claim on spear phishing could be made more convincing if their
study included an extended range of speared phishing attacks. Otherwise,
one could also argue that the results exhibit biases due to the small
number of attack incidents used or the sophistication of the attacks used
in the study.
Jakobsson et al. have studied what makes phishing emails and web pages
appear authentic [50]. Elsewhere Jakobsson summarised comprehensively
what typical computer users are able to detect when they are carefully
watching for signs of phishing [48]. The findings are are:
1. spelling and design matter;
2. third party endorsements depend on brand recognition;
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The SiteKey system was introduced in 2005 to simplify au-
thentication by not forcing the user to install additional soft-
ware. SiteKey uses a system of visual authentication images
that are selected by the user at the time of enrollment. When
the user enters his or her username, the image is displayed.
If the user recognizes the image as the original shared secret,
it is safe to enter the password [2]. However, a recent study
found that 92% of participants still logged in to the website
using their own credentials when the correct image was not
present [19]. However, this sample may have been drawn
from a biased population since others refused to participate,
citing privacy and security concerns.
Some argue that the use of extended validation (EV) certifi-
cates may help users detect phishing websites. An EV cer-
tificate differs from a standard SSL certificate because the
website owner must undergo background checks. A regular
certificate only tells a user that the certificate was granted
by a particular issuing authority, whereas an EV certificate
also says that it belongs to a legally recognized company [4].
The newest version of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer sup-
ports EV certificates, coloring the URL bar green and dis-
playing the name of the company. However, a recent study
found that EV certificates did not make users less likely to
fall for phishing attacks. The study also found that after
reading a help file, users were less suspicious of fraudulent
websites that did not yield warning indicators [13].
Many web browser extensions for phishing detection cur-
rently exist. Unfortunately, a recent study on anti-phishing
toolbar accuracy found that these tools fail to identify a sub-
stantial proportion of phishing websites [26]. A 2006 study
by Wu et al. found that the usability of these tools is also
lacking because many of them use passive indicators. Many
users fail to notice the indicators, while others often do not
trust them because they think the sites look trustworthy [23].
A MODEL FOR WARNINGS
In this paper we will analyze our user study results using
a model from the warnings sciences. Computer scientists
can benefit from studies in this field. Many studies have ex-
amined “hazard matching” and “arousal strength.” Hazard
matching is defined as accurately using warning messages to
convey risks—if a warning does not adequately convey risk,
the user may not take heed of the warning. Arousal strength
is defined as the perceived urgency of the warning [12].
To date, few studies have been conducted to evaluate the
arousal strength of software warnings. In one study of warn-
ing messages used in Microsoft Windows, researchers found
that using different combinations of icons and text greatly af-
fected participants’ risk perceptions. Participants were shown
a series of dialog boxes with differing text and icons, and
were instructed to estimate the severity of the warnings us-
ing a 10-point Likert scale. The choice of icons and words
greatly affected how each participant ranked the severity.
The researchers also examined the extent to which individu-
als will continue to pay attention to a warning after seeing it
multiple times (“habituation”). They found that users dis-
missed the warnings without reading them after they had
seen them multiple times. This behavior continued even
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Figure 4. Diagram of the different phases of the C-HIP model [21].
when using a similar but different warning in a different sit-
uation. The only way of recapturing the user’s attention was
to increase the arousal strength of the warning [1].
Wogalter proposed the Communication-Human Information
Processing Model (C-HIP) for structuring warning research,
as shown in Figure 4. He suggests that C-HIP be used to
identify reasons that a particular warning is ineffective [21].
The C-HIP model begins with a source delivering a warning
through a channel to a receiver, who receives it along with
other environmental stimuli that may distract from the mes-
sage. The receiver goes through five information processing
steps, which ultimately determine whether the warning re-
sults in any change in behavior.
We can ask the following questions to examine the different
steps in Wogalter’s model [5]:
1. Attention Switch and Maintenance—Do users notice the
indicators?
2. Comprehension/Memory—Do users know what the indi-
cators mean?
3. Comprehension/Memory—Do users know what they are
supposed to do when they see the indicators?
4. Attitudes/Beliefs—Do they believe the indicators?
5. Motivation—Are they motivated to take the recommended
actions?
6. Behavior—Will they actually perform those actions?
7. Environmental Stimuli — How do the indicators interact
with other indicators and other stimuli?
Observing users as they complete a task while thinking aloud
provides insights into most of the above questions. Alterna-
tively, users can complete tasks and then fill out post-task
questionnaires or participate in interviews, although these
require users to remember why they did something and re-
port it afterwards, and users sometimes say what they think
CHI 2008 Proceedings · Am I Safe April 5-10, 2008 · Florence, Italy
1067
Figure 2.3: C-HIP Model [86]
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3. too much emphasis on security can backfire;
4. people look at URLs;
5. people judge relevance before authenticity;
6. emails are very phishy, web pages are a bit phishy, and phone calls
are not;
7. padlock icons have limited direct effects; and
8. independent communication channels create trust.
These outcomes provide some comfort and yet are a source of considerable
worry, highlighting various opportunities and means of attack. That
people look at URLs is a good thing. However, the reason why users look
at URLs is not stated, and the degree of attention they pay to them is
unclear. The padlock would generally be viewed by many as a significant
security mechanism. Not by users, it would appear. The outcome related
to media/channel highlights the fact that phishers make highly effective
channel choices.
Jagatic et al. have shown how publicly available personal information
from social networks (such as Friendster, Myspace, Facebook, Orkut, and
Linkedin) can be used to launch effective context aware phishing attacks
[46]. In their studies they first determine a victim’s social networks and
then masquerade as one of their social contacts to create an email to the
victim (using email header spoofing techniques). Figure 2.4 illustrates the
details of the set up of the study. Their study has shown that not only is
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Figure 1: Illustration of phishing experiment: 1. Blogging, social network, and other public
data is harvested; 2. data is correlated and stored in a relational database; 3. heuristics are
used to craft “spoofed” email message by Eve “as Alice” to Bob (a friend); 4. message is
sent to Bob; 5. Bob follows the link contained within the email and is sent to an unchecked
redirect; 6. Bob is sent to attacker whuffo.com site; 7. Bob is prompted for his University
credentials; 8. Bob’s credentials are verified with the University authenticator; 9a. Bob is
successfully phished; 9b. Bob is not phished in this session; he could try again.
with 70% of the successful authentications occurring in that time frame. This supports the
importance of rapid takedown, the process of causing offending phishing sites to become
non-operative, whether by legal means (through the ISP of the phishing site) or by means
of denial of service attacks — both prominently used techniques. Figure 2B reports the
distributions of the number of times that victims authenticated or refreshed their credentials.
The reason for repeated visits to the simulated phisher site is that, as shown in Figure 1,
victims who successfully authenticated were shown a fake message indicating that the server
was overloaded and asking them to try again later. A real phisher would not need to do
this of course, but we wanted to count how many victims would catch on or continue to be
deceived; those who repeatedly authenticate give us a lower bound on the number of victims
who continue to be deceived. The log-log plots in Figure 2B highlight distributions with
long tails — some users visited the site (and disclosed their passwords) over 80 times. This
in spite of many ways to detect the phishing attack, e.g., mouse-over, host name lookup,
4
Figure 2.4: Context Aware Phishing Attacks Experiment Design [46]
it very easy to exploit the social network data available on the Internet,
but it also incr ases the effectiveness of the atta k significantly. In their
experiment, the attacks that took advantage of social networks were four
times as likely to succeed.
Below is an explanation of Figure 2.4 (dir ctly taken from [46]):
1. Blogging, social network, and other public data is harves-
t ; 2. data is correl ted and stored in a relati al database; 3.
heuristics are used to craft “spoofed” email message by Eve
“as Alice” to Bob (a friend); 4. message is sent to Bob; 5. Bob
follows the link contained within the email and is sent to an
unchecked redirect; 6. Bob is sent to attacker whuffo.com site;
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At least two organizations have initiated phishing attacks 
against their own members, with the goal of teaching them 
to protect themselves. [ 3] The US Military Academy at 
West Point found that more than 80% of its cadets 
succumbed to a phishing attack by a fictional colonel.  The 
State of New York mounted two attacks on its 10,000 
employees; 15% were spoofed by the first attack, but only 
8% by the second, which came three months later. 
Besides the security toolbars we tested, there are other anti-
phishing solutions that help users to differentiate the 
legitimate web sites from the phishing ones. Dynamic 
Security Skins [ 6] proposes to use a randomly generated 
visual hash to customize the browser window or web form 
elements to indicate the successfully authenticated sites. 
PassMark [ 18] includes a personalized image in a web page 
to indicate that the user has set up an account with the site. 
Google Safe Browsing for Firefox [ 12] pops up an alert 
when a user is on a web page that Google determines to be 
illegitimate. The content of the phishing page is also 
darkened to make it less convincing. Internet Explorer 7 
[ 19] protects against phishing with a dynamically-updated 
black list of known phishing web sites, a client-side list of 
acceptable sites, and a set of heuristics. It blocks the user's 
activity with a detected phishing site. IE7 also has stricter 
enforcement of SSL certificates, in that it will not display 
websites with certificates that are invalid. A comprehensive 
survey of anti-phishing solutions can be found in [ 8]. 
STUDY DESIGN 
To simplify the study design, we grouped the features of the 
five existing toolbars into three simulated toolbars (figure 
2), based on the three types of information that existing 
security toolbars display:   
The Neutral Information toolbar shows website 
information, such as domain name, hostname, registration 
date and hosting country, as SpoofStick and Netcraft 
Toolbar do. With this information, users must use their own 
judgment and experience to decide whether a site is 
legitimate or phishing. 
The SSL-Verification toolbar differentiates sites that use 
SSL from those that do not. SSL sites are displayed with the 
site’s logo and CA; a general warning message is displayed 
for other sites. This approach that imitates Trustbar seeks to 
make the user suspicious when a non-SSL page asks for 
sensitive information such as a password or credit card 
number.  
The System-Decision toolbar displays a red light and the 
message “Potential Fraudulent Site” if it decides that a web 
page is actually a phishing attack, an approach that is 
similar in design to both eBay Account Guard and 
SpoofGuard. This display is easy for a user to interpret, but 
it requires the user to trust the toolbar’s decision process, 
which is generally hidden from the user.  
 Study Implementation 
In order to simulate attacks against users, we needed to 
completely control the display of the toolbars and other 
security indicators.  Users in the study interacted with a 
simulated Internet Explorer built inside an HTML 
application running in full screen mode (figure 3). Different 
HTML frames displayed different browser components, 
including the security toolbars. The locations and sizes of 
the toolbars were consistent with the existing toolbars that 
they are based on. The Neutral-Information toolbar and the 
System-Decision toolbar were located below the address 
bar and above the main browsing window. The SSL-
Verification toolbar was located below the title bar and 
above the menu bar. The address bar took the FireFox 
approach by using the yellow background and a lock icon to 
indicate SSL connections. The status bar also displayed a 
lock icon for SSL connections. 
Our study simulated ideal phishing attacks whose content is 
a perfect copy of the actual website. This is realistic, since 
an attacker might not bother mirroring the entire site, but 
might simply act as a man-in-the-middle between the user 
and the real site. The attackers would pass the real web 
pages to the user and the user’s submitted data to the real 
site and in the meantime capture the user’s sensitive data 
during the online transaction. As such, the main frame in 
our browser always connected to the real website, 
Neutral-Information toolbar
SSL-Verification toolbar
System-Decision toolbar
Figure 2. The three simulated toolbars tested in the study 
Figure 3. Browser simulation using HTML frames 
Address bar frame Security toolbar frame
Main frame Status bar frame
Figure 2.5: Three Simulated Toolbars [88]
7. Bob is prompted for his University credentials; 8. Bob’s
credentials are verified with the University authenticator; 9a.
Bob is successfully phished; 9b. Bob is not phished in this
session; he could try again.
Wu et al. have discovered by conducting two user studies that the se-
curity tools such as security t olbars are not effective ough to protect
people from falling victim to phishing attacks [88]. Features of five tool-
bars are grouped into three imulated toolb rs. The thre simulated
toolbars shown in Figure 2.5 are: the Neutral Information toolbar, the
SSL-Verification toolbar, and the System-Decision toolbar.
In the user study researchers set up dummy accounts in the name of
"John Smith" at various legitimate e-commerce websites and then asked
the participants to protect those passwords. The participants played the
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role of John Smith’s personal assistant and were given a printout of John’s
profile, including his fictitious personal and financial information and a
list of his user names and passwords. The task was to process 20 email
messages, most of which were requests by John to handle a forwarded
message from an e-commerce site. Each message contained a link for
the user to click. Some messages are carefully prepared phishing attacks.
The researchers then study the participants’ response when using various
toolbars. Most participants fall victim to the phishing attacks. Based on
their findings, the authors suggest that:
1. the alert should always appear at the right time with the right
warning message;
2. user intentions should be respected, and if users must make security-
critical decisions they should be made consciously; and
3. and it is best to integrate security concerns into the critical path of
their tasks so that users must address them.
The user study set up by Wu et al. may lead the users to behave less
securely, because the account used is artificial and there are no negative
consequences for the participants. Under those conditions users may
behave differently than they normally do with their own accounts.
Florencio et al. have carried out a large scale study of password use
and password reuse habits [28]. Their study involves half million users
over a three month period. Software on the client machine recorded the
password usage, strength, and use frequency, etc. They estimated the
average number of distinct passwords of a user was 7, and on average
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each password is used in 6 different websites. Weak passwords are
reused more often than strong passwords. A user on average has over 25
password accounts. Users do use stronger passwords for more important
accounts. They also discovered that even as users perceive the need, or
are forced, to use stronger passwords, it appears that they use longer
lower-case passwords and use upper case and special characters hardly at
all. Users appear to forget passwords and perform other administrative
functions (reset or change password) a lot. For example, Yahoo password
change operations occur 15% as frequently as Yahoo sign-in operations.
Downs et al. conducted interviews with 20 non-expert computer users to
reveal their strategies and understand their decisions when encountering
possibly suspicious emails [24]. They have found:
• average users are more aware of the threats to computers and con-
fidential information caused by malware than by social engineering
attacks;
• Users do pay attention to security indicators but lack sufficient
knowledge to correctly interpret them. Interpretation of URL strings
is a good example.
• Most user strategies to decide the trustworthiness of email are based
on the content of the email. Again this shows users’ awareness of
threats but lack of knowledge to make correct judgements given
current user interface design.
For many years malware such as viruses received a great deal of attention.
Furthermore many users may be familiar with (automated) updates of
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anti-malware software. We should not be too surprised at the first out-
come above. The underlying cause for the second point may be impossible
to fix on a wide scale. The final outcome confirms the Jakobsson’s view
that relevance is more important than authenticity.
Wright et al. tested and extended the Model of Deception Detection [37]
by Grazioli [87] 2. The researchers aimed to understand how users determ-
ine whether the communications they receive are legitimate or not, and
claimed that users’ web experience and propensity to trust are the two
most influential factors in determining whether users will successfully
detect deception. In their user study, carefully prepared phishing email
messages were sent to participants, and follow up interviews were also
conducted to gain insights into the why participants successfully detected
deceptions. The participants of this user study were all university stu-
dents, and the majority of them were well educated in terms of technical
knowledge of the Internet. The characteristics of the participants were
certainly different from those of the general public. Hence, the findings
of this study may not generalise. The model of deception detection will
be further discussed in chapter 3.
2.4.1 Timing Attack Techniques
Personalised phishing attacks/spear phishing attacks have much better
chances of obtaining victims’ sensitive information. To launch such
attacks the attacker must first obtain any necessary information such as
2Wright’s work was published after the completion and publication of the work that
form the basis of Chapter 3 of this thesis (The author was unaware of the work of
Grazioli.)
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victims’ names, with whom they have bank account, etc. Bortz et al. have
described two timing–attack methods which can be used to obtain private
information and have discussed methods for writing web application
code that resists these attacks [10].
They call the first method the direct timing attack. An attacker can launch
this attack directly from their own machine by analysing the response
time from a website. It can expose information such as the validity of a
user name at a secured site. In the case of proving validity of a user name
at a secured website, they demonstrated the attack method by directly
communicating with the web server and carefully timing the response.
They use both valid and invalid user names to login to the web server, and
compare the time the web server takes to respond to login requests. As
shown in Figure 2.6 there is a significant difference between the response
times.
The second method is called the cross-site timing attack, which enables a
malicious website to obtain information by sending data from a user’s
computer. The direct attacks are limited to discovery of static information,
it can not reveal private information such as a user’s current status on
Internet e.g. which websites he/she is logged into. In reality, if a user logs
into a website, there will be some cache mechanism enabled on the server
side or else a cookie will likely be set up on the client side to improve the
response time. So if one can make requests as another user, whether a
user has logged into a certain website or not by analysing the response
time. This attack method is only possible when a user victim is visiting
a malicious website. The malicious website contains JavaScript code to
make requests to target websites and time the response. Figure 2.7 shows
that there are significant timing differences if victims are logged on to
the target websites. Using this method, a malicious website, in some
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on the server itself) and multiplicative (n threads of execu-
tion on the server take n times as long to complete).
Obviously, if these sources are not as large as the computa-
tion itself, they do not pose any difficulty in timing. As they
grow more significant, multiple samples can be used to av-
erage out the large variance in timing that the noise causes.
Specifically, since the noise is strictly non-negative, and in
practice very skewed, the sample most likely to have small
noise is the one with the smallest absolute time. Therefore,
to effectively reduce the noise in these timing tests, we keep
only the smallest.
For the purposes of collecting experimental data, a pro-
gram timed a collection of pages at a given site many times
spread uniformly over a reasonable stretch of time. This
timing data generated an estimate for the actual distribu-
tion of times, and was used to calculate the estimated dis-
tribution for the various sampling methods actually used.
This allowed us to estimate the reliability of the timing at-
tacks without making millions of requests to commercial web
servers.
3.2 Testing for boolean values
The most simple timing attack is a boolean test: does
some condition on the server’s hidden data hold or not. One
such condition is used by attackers today, although with
limited success: ‘Is this the right password for the specified
user?’. Such brute-force password attacks work only when
the website is poorly designed (does not limit the rate at
which a single user can attempt to log in) and the user has
chosen a common or easily guessable password.
However a different attack, with a very similar idea, works
surprisingly well on the majority of popular web sites: ‘Does
this username correspond to a valid user of this site?’. Since
a great many web sites use email addresses as usernames,
this data can be used to validate large lists of potential email
addresses for the purposes of spam3. Moreover, knowledge
of which sites the user of an email address regularly visits is
useful for invasive advertising and phishing.
Because most sites do not currently consider this a sig-
nificant attack, they unwittingly provide attackers with the
means to get this data without timing at all, through the
ubiquitous ‘Forgot my password’ page. This page, which
is all but required on major sites, often reveals whether
the specified email address is associated with a valid user
or not. Some sites clearly acknowledge weaknesses in their
reset page by adding layers of protection to it, such as a
CAPTCHA [5], requiring the additional input of personal
information of the account holder, and only sending the
password or a means to reset it to the email address of the ac-
count holder. However, even well designed sites that clearly
consider user account validity to be an important breach of
privacy are frequently vulnerable to direct timing of their
login page.
Figure 1 gives an example of two popular, high-traffic sites
where timing the login page leaks user account validity. The
figure shows the mean and standard deviation of the time
taken to respond to a login attempt for a set of valid and
invalid email addresses, taking the smallest of 10 samples.
The mean and standard deviation were computed by taking
3Given a list of potential email addresses, an attacker can
test each one against a set of popular web sites. This process
will not only produce a list of valid email addresses, but also
some additional personal data on each.
Figure 1: Distinguishing valid from invalid user ac-
counts
many hundreds of samples of each type, and calculating the
distribution that would occur when the smallest of 10 ran-
dom samples is taken. The data clearly shows a separation
between valid and invalid emails that is sufficient to predict
accurately more than 95% of the time. Using more than 10
samples would provide an even more accurate distinguisher.
3.3 Estimating the size of hidden data
Many computations that go into web applications involve
taking data sets and displaying some filtered or processed
version of them on a page. Frequently, the actual size of the
data set itself is meant to be hidden from the user, based on
some sort of access control. Simple examples that are widely
used on the web include blogs where individual entries can
be shown only to chosen groups of users, and photo galleries
where a similar preference can be specified for albums or
individual photos. Sometimes, entries can be marked ‘pri-
vate’, visible only to the owner of the site, which can be
used to edit items before making them visible to the world.
The total number of items in the data set, and the relative
change in items over time, represent significant hidden data
that can often be discovered using timing.
Inherent in the process of dealing with a data set is having
WWW 2007 / Track: Security, Privacy, Reliability, and Ethics Session: Defending Against Emerging Threats
623
Figure 2.6: The Direct Timing Attack: Response Time Difference [10]
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cases, could also discover the number of objects in the user’s shopping
cart. This method could be used to assist in-session phishing attacks or
discover users’ relationships with certain websites.
Timing channels have been known for some time. For example, the US
Department of Defence’s principal Trusted System Evaluation Criteria
identifies such covert channels as a threat [4]. The exploitation of timing
properties led to a very high profile key discovery attack by Kocher [56].
It is perhaps not surprising that social engineering now avails itself of
such mechanisms
2.4.2 Discovering Browsing History
A user’s browsing history contains information that may allow sophistic-
ated personalised phishing attacks to be created. It could reveal whose
customer the user is and who their email account provider is. With
this information attackers can tailor their phishing attacks rather than
send out random cold phishing messages to a large number of email
addresses.
Below, a method that does not exploit any browser vulnerabilities is
described. This method takes advantage of a feature of the web browser
standard – for a visited URL address the hypertext link pointing to such
an address is displayed in a different colour to those hypertext links
pointing to addresses that have not been visited. By retrieving the colour
property of the hypertext link, attackers can find out whether a user has
visited the address the hypertext link points to. Attackers can have those
hypertext link embedded into websites under their control, and make
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the hypertext link point to the websites which their attacks are targeting.
There are two methods to retrieve the colour property: one is by using
JavaScript and the other is by using CSS. Sample code is shown below:
// Javascript example:
var node = document.createElement("a");
a.href = url ;
var color = getComputedStyle(node, null).getPropertyValue.("color");
if (color == "rgb(0,0,255)") { ........}
// CSS example:
<style>a:visited
{background: url ( track .php?bank.com);}
</style>
<a href= "http :// bank.com"> hi</a>
2.4.3 Retrieving Personal Information in Web 2.0
Personal information is often openly published on websites and pub-
lic databases. Such information could be used by attackers to launch
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spear-phishing attacks and in the worst cases they can directly obtain
authentication credentials.
A user’s mother’s maiden name is often used by financial services as one
of the user authentication credentials. Virgil Griffith et al. have invented
novel techniques to automatically infer mother’s maiden names from
public records [38]. As a proof of concept, they applied their techniques
to publicly available records from the state of Texas. Other personal
information such as date of birth, name, and even home address could
also be obtained by scanning social network websites. These techniques,
once understood, do not require any insider information or particular
skills to implement. They pose serious threats to the integrity of users’
authentication credentials.
Social media presents significant opportunities for the unwary to reveal
far too much information. In May 2011, Twitter users responded to
requests to form their “Royal Wedding Name”. Suggestions for how to do
this included: start with “lord” or “lady” and forming a double barrelled
surname involving the street where you live. Other advice suggested
using your mother’s maiden name. It may be fun. It is also clearly
dangerous from a security point of view. Anti-malware and security
specialist Sophos have posted information to indicate why participating
in such activities is a bad idea.
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2.5 Technology Countermeasures
To counter the phishing threat systematically, new systems and software
have been invented. Based on how these systems prevent users from
falling victim, I classify them into three approaches: secure authentication
methods, indicators and visual cues to help users detect phishing attacks,
and phishing attack detection. Users fail to distinguish phishing websites
from legitimate websites because of the poor usability of the server to
user authentication. The first two approaches focus on improving that,
and the third approach tries to reduce the chances of users being tricked
by detecting the phishing websites or emails automatically. I will review
the major contributions in each approach in this section.
2.5.1 Novel Indicators and Visual Cues
Conventional SSL/TSL digital certificates have failed to provide sufficient
secure server to user authentication, because users either do not pay
attention to them or they are not able to use the certificates to distinguish
phishing websites from legitimate websites. Extended validation certific-
ates (EVs) [43] have been proposed to provide more secure and usable
server to user authentication. EVs require more extensive investigation of
the requesting entity by the certificate authority before being issued, so
an attacker is unlikely to get one. In contrast almost anybody can get a
SSL/TSL certificate. In supporting web browsers (most existing browsers
support EV, for example Microsoft Internet Explorer 8, Mozilla Firefox
3, Safari 3.2, Opera 9.5, and Google Chrome), more information will be
displayed for EV certificates than ordinary SSL certificates. To get an EV
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certificate the applicant must pass all criteria set by the Certificate Au-
thority. For every EV certificate issued, the Certificate Authority assigns
a specific EV identifier, which is registered with the browser vendors
who support EV. Only validated EV certificates receive enhanced display.
However, the effectiveness of such certificates is in doubt; a user study has
also found that EV does not improve users’ ability to recognize phishing
websites [45]. The small size of this study’s sample base (nine test subjects
per cell) is not big enough to strongly support the claim.
Microsoft InfoCard [12] is an identity meta-system that allows users
to manage their digital identities from various identity providers and
employ them in the different contexts where they are accepted to access
online services. Users first register at the identity providers to receive
various virtual cards from them. When they go to a web site and are
asked for identity data, they click the corresponding virtual card, which
will in turn start an authentication process between the current site and
the identity provider who issues that card. Again, users do not need
to type any sensitive data at all. The major problem with InfoCard is
that it needs the web sites and the identity providers who support it
to add new functionalities. Since InfoCard is a new way for users to
provide their identity information, web sites have to be modified to accept
the InfoCard submission, by adding an HTML OBJECT tag that triggers
the InfoCard process at the user’s browser. The sites also have to add
back end functionality to process the credentials generated from different
identity providers. Moreover, since InfoCard is an identity meta-system,
it needs support from various identity providers, including banks that
issue bank accounts, credit card companies that issue credit cards, and
government agencies that issue government IDs. These identity providers
also need to add functionality to process the InfoCard requests. In order
to use InfoCard, users have to contact different identity providers to
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obtain InfoCards from them, which introduces an out-of-band enrolment
process between the users and the identity providers.
Web Wallet [89] tries to create a unified interface for authentication. It
scans web pages for the login form. If such a form exists, then it asks
the user to explicitly indicate his/her intended site to login. If the user’s
intention matches the current site, it automatically fills the relevant web
page input fields. Otherwise a warning will be presented to the user.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the web wallet in IE 7. The idea of Web Wallet is
quite simple and should work if it can accurately detect the login form
and prevent users from directly inputting the authentication credentials
to a website. This will not be an issue for legitimate websites. However,
the same is not true for phishing websites, which may implement their
web pages in a way that can evade the login form detection. With the
help of JavaScript or Flash this is very easy to do.
2.5.2 Secure Authentication
Personalised information has been used at authentication web pages to
improve the usability of the server–to–user authentication. The logic
behind this approach is that only a legitimate website should know the
personalised information, hence a phishing website cannot do the same
and users will be able to distinguish the legitimate and phishing websites.
Visual information is mostly used in this approach, for example Yahoo
and Bank of America display a picture, which the user has configured
previously, at the login web page. Users must pay attention to check the
existence of the personalised picture, if no picture is displayed or the dis-
played picture is wrong then the current website is likely to be a phishing
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Figure 1. The Web Wallet in Internet Explorer 
Figure 2.8: Web Wallet
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website. Dynamic Security Skins [22] proposes to use a personal image
to identify the user’s master login window and a randomly generated
visual hash to customize the browser window or web form elements to
indicate successfully authenticated sites. The advantage of this type of
approach over other security indicators is that the message display is
much harder to spoof and is at the centre of the user’s attention so that
it cannot be easily ignored. The potential problem with this approach is
that authentication is still not forced and it places the burden on users
to notice the visual differences between a good site or interface and a
phishing one and then correctly infer that a phishing attack is under
way.
Security solution providers such as RSA provide hardware token based
multi-factor authentication to prevent phishing attacks. These systems do
not try to stop attackers from getting authentication credentials used in
the current session, because they use different authentication credentials
in future sessions. As long as the hardware token, which is used to gener-
ate the valid and unused authentication credentials, is uncompromised
attackers can not access users’ accounts. USB keys and smart cards are
often used as hardware tokens. However, there are some usability issues
with this method. It is not cheap to deploy such systems on a large
scale. It also requires users to carry extra hardware with them, and these
hardware tokens may be damaged or lost. Another uses multi-factor
authentication approaches with "someone you know" as a factor [11].
Mobile devices such as personal mobile phones have been used to create
more usable multi-factor authentication systems. Software can be installed
on the mobile phone to generate a one-time password, and work exactly
like other hardware tokens. In addition, since a mobile phone also has
a communication capability, the one-time password can be sent to the
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phone via SMS text instead of computed on the local device. No software
needs to be installed. The disadvantage of this method is mainly the
communication cost.
2.5.3 Detecting Phishing Attacks
The most widely deployed type of phishing detection system is the
blacklist based phishing website detection toolbar. Almost every web
browser has this feature as default, e.g Internet Explorer [63], Firefox 2
with google’s safe browsing [67]. There are also third party toolbars such
as Netcraft toolbar [68] and eBay toolbar[44], etc. These systems check
whether the URL of the current web page matches any URL in a list of
identified phishing web sites. The effectiveness of the detection depends
on how complete the blacklist is and how timely the blacklist is updated.
This type of detection system has a very low false positive rate; however,
there is inevitably a time gap between the launch of a phishing attack and
the URL of the phishing website being added to the blacklist. During the
time gap, users are at their most vulnerable as there is no protection at
all. According to an anti-phishing toolbar evaluation study [90], IE7 is the
best performing phishing detection toolbar, but it still missed 25% of the
APWG phishing URLs and 32% of the phishtank.com phishing URLs.
SpoofGuard[16] is a typical signature and rule based detection system.
It first examines the current domain name and URL with the intention
to detect phishing websites that deliberately use the domain names or
URLs similar to those of the targeted sites. Secondly, the content of
the web page such as password fields, embedded links, and images,
are analysed. For images, it will check whether identical images have
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been found on other sites the user has visited. If it does, then it is
possible that the fraudulent site copied the image from the legitimate site.
Finally, spoofGuard computes a score for each web page in the form of
a weighted sum of the results of each set of heuristics. There are three
possible outcomes:
• if the score is higher than a certain threshold, the toolbar warns the
user that the current website is fraudulent and displays a red icon;
• if the score is lower than the threshold but there are heuristics
triggers, the toolbar displays a yellow icon which indicates that it
cannot make a determination about the site.
• if no heuristics are triggered, a green icon is displayed.
The weights for each set of heuristics can be modified by users as well.
SpoofGuard runs on Microsoft Windows 98/NT/2000XP with Internet
Explorer. Despite its relatively high detection rate, it also suffers high
false positives [90]. In addition, most users are unlikely to be able to
adjust the weights of each set of heuristics, and as a result the detection
accuracy may be reduced.
CANTINA [91] detects phishing websites based on the TF-IDF inform-
ation retrieval algorithm. Once a web page is loaded, it retrieves the
key words of the current web page and five key words with the highest
TF-IDF weights are fed to the search engine (in this case it is Google).
If the domain name of the current web page matches the domain name
of the 30 top search results, it is considered to be a legitimate web site,
otherwise, it is deemed to be a phishing site. (The value of 30 has been
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determined by experiment to provide a balance between low false positive
and high detection accuracy.) According to the developer’s evaluation,
it can detect over 95% of phishing websites. However, this does not
necessarily mean in reality 95% of phishing will be detected. Once the
method of the detection is known to attackers, then they can easily bypass
the detection by using images instead of text, or using Javascripts to hide
the text, or using keyword stuffing to mislead the TF-IDF algorithm.
Ying Pan et al. have invented a phishing website detection system which
examines anomalies in web pages, in particular, the discrepancy between
a web site’s identity and its structural features and HTTP transactions
[72].
Many anti-phishing email filters have been invented to fight phishing
via email, as it is the primary channel for phishers to reach victims.
SpamAssassin [3], PILFER [27], and Spamato [7] are typical examples
of those systems. They apply predefined rules and characteristics often
found in phishing emails to analyse incoming emails. PHONEY [14] is
different from the phishing email detection system mentioned before. It
tries to detect phishing emails by mimicking user responses and providing
fake information to suspicious web sites that request critical information.
The web sites’ responses are forwarded to the decision engine for further
analysis. However, its ability to decide what type of information is
actually being requested is limited and the approach is easily bypassed.
(An attacker can relay the user input to the legitimate website, so that
they could behave exactly like the legitimate website.)
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2.5.4 Phishing Attacks Threat Modelling
Although phishing attacks have caused serious financial damage and
have reduced users’ confidence in the security of e-commerce, there is still
a lack of methods to systematically analyse a given user authentication
system for both system and user side vulnerabilities. As far as I am aware,
the only published work that analyses the usability vulnerabilities of a
system is by Josang et al. [53].
Josang et al. present four “security action usability principles”:
1. Users must understand which security actions are required of them.
2. Users must have sufficient knowledge and the ability to take the
correct security action.
3. The mental and physical load of a security action must be tolerable.
4. The mental and physical load of making repeated security actions
for any practical number of instances must be tolerable.
These are supplemented by four “Security Conclusion” principles:
1. Users must understand the security conclusion (e.g the owner of a
digital certificate, or the top level domain of a URL) that is required
for making an informed decision.
2. The system must provide the user with sufficient information for
deriving the security conclusion.
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3. The mental load of deriving the security conclusion must be toler-
able.
4. The mental load of deriving security conclusions for any practical
number of instances must be tolerable.
The research described in the paper described the vulnerabilities caused
by violating the proposed usability principles. However, the vulnerab-
ilities they identified are not comprehensive enough for practical uses.
They have not considered all usability principles, for example, that the
alert given to user at the interface should be active enough to grab their
attention.
They also suggested that such vulnerabilities should be considered at the
same time as analysts consider technical vulnerabilities. This suggestion
makes sense as integration with existing methods should increase the
usability of the threat modelling method itself. However, the authors have
not introduced a clear and systematic approach that one could follow. As
illustrated in the three case studies; the threat modelling process lacks
structure and relies very much on one’s own experience and judgement.
2.6 Limitations of Current Work
The foundation for developing effective protection against phishing is
an understanding of why phishing attacks work. Extant user studies
have shed light on many important aspects of this issue. They have
addressed how users behave in given situations, what are their habits,
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and how they perceive trust and security in cyber space. However, these
studies have not been guided by a coherent framework. As a result, the
knowledge discovered by these studies varies in depth and lacks structure
for practitioners to absorb and use as design guidance. These studies
are also too closely linked to current technology; findings could become
invalid very quickly as systems, technologies, and user characteristics
and behaviours evolve.
There is also little literature addressing the threat modelling of the user
side of a system. Users are now frequently targeted by attackers, and to
be able to systematically discover the vulnerabilities posed by users is
just as important as discovering system vulnerabilities. It would be very
useful to be able to do the threat modelling on the user side of the system
at the design stage.
Finally, existing detection systems all have strengths in particular areas;
no system would appear superior in all aspects. Most of these detection
systems react to what phishing attackers have done, and the detection
algorithms are based on the manifestation of discovered phishing attacks.
As a result, attackers can evade detection by changing their tactics.
To address the issues identified above, in the next chapter I introduce
a phishing–user–interaction model to put existing knowledge into a
coherent framework, and identify the fundamental reasons why users
fall victim to phishing attacks. Chapter 4 presents new techniques for
identifying user-based threats in web authentication systems. Drawing
on the few principles established in the literature (e.g. these by Josang
et al.) but also providing significant extension. Chapter 5 presents a
proof-of-concept toolset that aims to overcome some of the disadvantages
posed by anti-phishing tools. Finally, Chapter 6 evaluates and concludes
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the work done and discusses future research areas.
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Chapter 3
A Phishing-User Interaction Model
This chapter introduces a psychological model to capture the general
process of the decision making during user-phishing interactions and
identifies important factors that can influence the outcome of such de-
cision making. At the end of the chapter I also show how this model can
be used to guide a wide range of applications:
• designing security tools/indicators;
• evaluating how well a phishing detection tool can assist users to
detect phishing attacks; and
• designing effective and efficient user education methods.
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3.1 Study Approach
The decision making process during user-phishing interaction was ana-
lysed using a collection of attack incidents. The analysis method is
cognitive walkthrough [13].
3.1.1 Why Decision Making?
The goals of phishing attacks are achieved by causing victims to carry out
actions which lead to the compromise of confidential information. Since
the actions users take are the realization of the decisions they have made,
attacks try to manipulate victims to make certain decisions. Hence, how
people make decisions when encountering phishing attacks is what really
matters.
3.1.2 Attack Incidents
A significant collection of social engineering and phishing attacks were
analysed with a view to extracting a behavioural model for the user.
Social engineering attack incidents are used to understand the big picture
about how people are manipulated into making decisions that would
satisfy an attacker’s goals. Phishing examples provide a particular focus
for our consideration.
The attack incidents collected are all real; 45 social engineering attacks
and 400 phishing attacks (collected from APWG [73] and Millersmiles
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[2]) are analysed. These attack incidents cover a comprehensive range of
attacking techniques, attack delivery channels, vulnerabilities exploited,
and attack goals. Unlike phishing attacks, there is no publically access-
ible social engineering attack incident data set. I collected those social
engineering attacks by editing the attack incidents reported by many
security practitioners working in the field. Besides the description of
attack incidents, a basic analysis for each attack can also be accessed at
http://www-users.cs.york.ac.uk/~xundong/se/dse.html. This data set is the first
of its kind, it can be useful for future research in this field as well as
security education. An example is shown in Figure 3.1.
3.1.3 Methodology
Interviewing victims of attacks provides one means of gaining insight
into their decision making process. However, locating victims is not easy1
and there would be difficulty ensuring that those interviewed really were
representative in any meaningful way. Victims are often embarrassed at
being conned, and reluctant to come forward in the first place. Another
approach would be to recreate such attacks in a controlled user study.
However, the range of attacks is significant. Recreating them under
experimental conditions would be very expensive. In addition, the context
in which some of these attacks took place has great influence on how
victims behave, and it is also very difficult to recreate such contexts.
A plausible approach to studying the collected attacks is the cognitive
walkthrough method [13]. This is an inspection method often used to
assess and improve usability of a piece of software or a web site. It can
1attack reports do not reveal victims’ identities
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Figure 3.1: A Social Engineering Attack Incident Retrieved From The
Collected Data Set
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generate results quickly with low cost.
The cognitive walkthrough focuses on the tasks users need to perform
and on the user interface through which users complete their tasks. There
are five steps in the procedure of the cognitive walkthrough [13]:
• Define the inputs to the walkthrough;
• Convene the analysis;
• Walk through the action sequences for each task;
• Record critical information;
• Revise the interface to fix the problems.
The final step is not required for the purpose of this research.
The first stage usually requires the definition of the following four factors
[13]:
• Identification of the users. Cognitive walkthrough does not usually
involve real users, so this is to identify the characteristics of the
targeted user group. Here the targeted users are the general public
who are capable of using the software but do not possess much
knowledge of the underlying technology.
• Sample tasks for evaluation. Here these are the attack incidents
described in the previous section.
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• Description (mock-ups) or implementation of the interface. In this
case, the user interfaces considered are not prototypes but the ones
that are most used by the general public already. For example, the
web browsers considered are IE7 and Firefox.
• Action sequences (scenarios) for completing the tasks. These are the
actions sequences exhibited when users fall victim to the attacks.
For each attack incident, having identified the action sequence the analysis
is done by first asking a series of questions for each step. Below are the
questions to be asked.
• What is the context of the user-phishing attack interaction?
• What are the users assumptions and expectations?
• What is the false perception attackers try to engineer in the victim’s
mind?
• What would be the expected feedback from the user interface to the
victim for each action they have taken?
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form false perceptions?
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form an accurate perception?
• Would users know what to do if they wished to check out the
authenticity of whom/what they are interacting with? If so, is it
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easy to perform the check consistently?
The answers from these questions provide insights into how users interact
with a phishing attack and form the basis for analysing why they fall
victim. Based on these analyses, a user-phishing interaction model is
abstracted. The findings described in the following sections are all based
on the analysis conducted during the walkthroughs. The model starts
when users encounter a phishing attack and finishes at the point where
all actions have been taken. An example of the cognitive walkthrough
can be found in the appendix.
3.2 Overview of the Interaction
During a human-computer interaction, the user’s role in phishing attacks
is to retrieve relevant information, translate the information into a series
of actions, and then carry out those actions. The overview of the model is
shown in Figure 3.2.
There are three obvious types of information users can use when encoun-
tering phishing attacks, and they are connected to users in Figure 3.2
by solid arrows. External information is information retrieved from the
user interface (including the phishing emails/communication) as well as
other sources (such as experts’ advice). The context is the social context
the user is currently in. It is the user’s perception of the state of the
world, comprising information on things such as recent news, what is
happening around the user, the user’s past behaviour, social networks, etc.
Knowledge and context are built up over time and precede the phishing
61
Chapter 3 A Phishing-User Interaction Model
Figure 3.2: The Overview of User-Phishing Interaction
interaction. External information must be specifically retrieved during
the interaction. The information items displayed on the user interface are
the most obvious and immediately available external information to users.
As a result, they are always used in the interaction. External information
from other sources is selected only when certain conditions occur, such
as a user becoming suspicious.
It usually takes more than one step to reach the action that could lead
to the disclosure of the information that attackers seek. For example, an
email based phishing attack may require victims to read the phishing
emails, click on embedded URL links and finally give out confidential
information at the linked phishing web sites. For each completed action,
users have expectations of what will happen next (the feedback from the
system) based on their action and understanding of the system. This
expectation, together with the perception constructed in the previous
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steps, are carried forward when users decide whether to take the next
action. Since these two types of information exist only during the lifetime
of the interaction, we present them differently in Figure 3.2. This decision
making happens each time before an action is taken. Thus Figure 3.2
includes a feedback arrow from action to external info. Among the
information that could influence one’s decision making, the attackers can
directly affect only the information displayed by the user interface.
3.3 The Decision Making Model
From analysis of the walkthroughs two types of decisions that users make
during user-phishing interactions are apparent:
1. planning what actions to take; and
2. deciding whether to take the next planned action or not.
The decision regarding what actions to take happens before the second
type of decision making. The decision regarding what actions to take will
be referred to as the primary decision, and the other will be referred to as
the secondary decision. The secondary decision clearly takes place after
the primary decision. It seems the expectation and perception constructed
in the primary decision making process influences significantly what, and
the amount of, external information a user selects during the second-
ary decision making process. As a result, users’ ability in discovering
false perceptions during the two types of decision making are not the
same. The fundamental steps within the two decision making process are
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identical, although the detailed characteristics of each step are different
(the differences as well as their implications are discussed in later sec-
tions). With reference to general decision making theory [9, 51, 55, 78, 75],
both types of decision making can be divided into the following three
stages:
• construction of the perception of the current situation;
• generation of possible actions to respond; and
• generation of assessment criteria and choosing an action accord-
ingly.
These are now discussed.
Construction of the Perception
The perception that users have constructed in this stage describes the
situation users are facing and goals they want to achieve. The perception
is constructed by first selecting the information, and then interpreting
the information selected. The author suggests using the following four
aspects to describe perception:
• Space
– Direction of the interaction, e.g. who initiates the communica-
tion.
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– Media, through which the communication and interaction
occur, for example, via email, phone, etc.;
• Participants
– Agent, who begins the interaction;
– Beneficiary, who benefits;
– Instrument, who helps accomplish the action;
– Object that is involved in the interaction, for example, it could
be personal/business confidential information that the attacker
would like to obtain;
– Recipient, who is the party that an agent tries to interact with;
• Causality
– Cause of the interaction, what caused the interaction to occur;
– Purpose of the interaction, what an agent tries to achieve;
• Suggestions
– Explicit suggested actions to reach the goal; and
– Implied actions to reach the goal.
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In the rest of this chapter these four aspects will be used to describe a
user’s perception.
The mismatch between a user’s perception and actual fact has previously
been described as the mismatch between a user’s mental model of the
information system and actual implementation [31]. This understanding
is too general to be useful in detailed analysis. Using the above four
aspects we can discover that the false perception, which phishers try to
engineer, has two mismatches with actual fact:
1. some perceived participants are not actual participants; and
2. the perceived causality (the cause of the communication and the
consequence of the suggested actions) is not the actual causality.
These two mismatches exist in every phishing attack analysed, because the
real participants are the phishers, their phishing websites, etc. rather than
the legitimate organisations or persons whom the victims trust; and the
true motive is to steal people’s confidential information rather than any
causality phishers suggest. Failure to discover such mismatches allows
phishing attacks to succeed. A later section of this chapter discusses how
users could discover such mismatches and why they often fail to do so.
During primary decision making, a perception (defining the four aspects
of the perception) is created from scratch. Once this initial perception is
created, during secondary decision making users focus on refining and
confirming the perception created by selecting information from feedback
from the actions they have already taken. There is a significant amount
of psychological research [75] to suggest that when selecting information
from feedback, users have a strong information selection bias – they tend
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to select information that confirms their initial perception and ignore
facts that contradict it. Users are unlikely to change their perception
unless they discover facts or information that contradict to the existing
perception.
Generation of Possible Solutions
Factors such as time, knowledge, available resource, personality, capability,
etc. all affect the set of actions one can generate. Interestingly, the author’s
analysis of collected phishing attacks suggests that the user’s intelligence
in generating possible actions is not one of the major factors in deciding
whether they fall victim to phishing attacks or not. It is not people’s
stupidity that makes them fall victim to phishing attacks.
Analysis of the set of phishing attacks collected by the author revealed
an interesting feature: the victim generally does not need to work out a
solution to problems presented. Rather, the attacker kindly provides the
victims with a “solution”, which is also the action they want victims to
take. For example, an email message stating that there is a problem with
a user’s authentication data may also indicate that the problem can be
“solved” by the user visiting a linked website to “confirm” his/her data.
If the situation is as presented, then the “solution” provided is a rational
course of action. Unfortunately, the situation is not as presented.
In some attacks the solution is not explicitly given, but it can be easily
worked out by common sense. For example, the attackers first send
users an email appearing to be a notice of an e-card sent by a friend.
Such e-card websites are database driven, the URL link to access the
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card often contains parameters for the database search. The URL link
that the attackers present to victims has two parts: the domain name of
the website and the parameter to get the card. The former points to the
legitimate website, but the parameter is faked. As a result, the user will
see an error page automatically generated by the legitimate website. At
the end of the email attackers also present a link for people to retrieve the
card if the given URL link is not working. This time the link points to the
phishing website which will ask for people’s address and other personal
information. In this attack victims have not been told to click the spoofed
URL link, but “common sense” suggests using the backup link provided
when the first link they have been given has failed.
Phishing attacks can be viewed as follows. The attacker tries to engineer
a false perception within the victim’s mind, and also tries to simplify the
solution generation stage by telling users what actions he/she should
take to respond to the false perception. He or she must now decide only
whether to take the suggested means of solving the problem – the user
does not feel a need or desire to generate any alternatives. Simplifying
users’ decision making processes might make users spend less time on
selecting information. The chances of users discovering any mismatch of
perception is also reduced.
This is one of the important differences between the user-phishing in-
teraction and the general user-computer interaction where users have to
work out the actions to reach the goals themselves. In fact, users need
to do little to generate any solutions, so the solution generation is not
presented in the graphical model illustrated later in this chapter.
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Generation of Assessment Criteria and Choosing the Solution
To decide whether to follow the suggested action is the focus of this stage.
A user generates the criteria to evaluate the resulting gains and losses of
possible actions, then evaluates those actions and chooses the best one.
Sometimes the criteria are already established, such as one’s world view,
and personal preferences. Sometimes criteria must be carefully developed.
Each individual’s experience, knowledge, personal preferences and even
emotional/physical state can affect the assessment criteria. However,
most of the phishing attacks analysed did not take advantage of the
differences between users, instead they took advantage of what users
have in common.
In all phishing attacks analysed, besides engineering a false perception,
attackers also suggest a solution to respond to the false perception. The
solution suggested is rational according to the false perception and it is
also very likely to satisfy some of the victim’s assessment criteria. For
example, everyone wants their bank account authentication credentials to
be secure, and so a solution which appears to increase security “ticks the
box” – it simply appears to provide them with something they actually
want. We should not be surprised when they accept this solution and act
on it. Similarly, users will (usually) feel a need to follow an organisation’s
policy, and so will most likely follow instructions that appear to come
from authority. Being friendly, helpful to others, curious to interesting
things, and willingness to engage in reciprocative actions (often used by
social engineering attacks), are all common criteria.
As long as the victims have not discovered the mismatch between the false
perception and the truth, they would indeed want to follow the suggested
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actions and the evaluation of this stage would most likely be “yes”. To
make the user’s position even worse many users have a natural tendency
to follow the instructions from the authorities or their service providers.
As a result, they may not even carefully evaluate the suggestions provided
at all. Again this stage is also secondary in deciding whether users fall
victim to phishing attacks, so I exclude it from my graphical model.
3.3.1 Graphical Model
In a user phishing interaction, the user first decides the sequence of actions
(primary decision), and then follows the decision making process con-
cerned with whether to take the next planned action (secondary decision).
The secondary decision making is carried out repeatedly prior to each
action a user takes. Both types of decision making processes comprise
the same three stages. However, their characteristics are different.
In the primary decision making process, there are no perceptions con-
structed already. Users need to form their initial perceptions by selecting
a wide range of external information. In contrast, in the secondary de-
cision making process, users have previously constructed perceptions and
expectations to influence their selection of external information. The eval-
uation of whether to take the chosen solution (the next planned action)
mainly depends on whether the feedback from previous actions matches
expectation, while the evaluation stage for the primary decision is more
general and flexible. For example, when users click the hyper links em-
bedded in phishing emails, they expect the web browser to present to
them the legitimate website that the phishers are trying to impersonate.
If they perceive the website presented by the browser (the feedback) as
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the legitimate one (the expectation), then they will carry out the next
planned action, which could simply be giving out their authentication
credentials. If the users have constructed a correct perception (they have
been presented with a phishing website), which does not match their
expectation, their next planned action will not be taken.
Regardless of the type of decision making process, construction of an
accurate perception is key to detecting phishing attacks. People’s ability
to work out solutions and evaluate the alternatives plays little part in
preventing them from falling victim to phishing attacks in both types of
decision making. Because the perception construction is so important,
it is also the main focus of our graphical model, which is shown in
Figure 3.3.
As there are multiple actions in each interaction and for each action
users have a decision to make, the model has two loops. In the model,
each cycle represents the decision making for one action and the cycle
begins with the “available information” and ends when an action is taken.
Once the action is taken then there will be new information available
and decision making for the next action begins. For each interaction,
the first cycle of this model describes the decision making regarding the
planning of the sequence of actions to take, and the rest of the cycles
are concerned with deciding whether to take the next planned action or
not. The model is validated against the analysed phishing attacks in the
cognitive walkthrough.
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3.4 False Perceptions and Mismatches
Because perception construction is the most important factor in deciding
whether users fall victim to phishing attacks, in this section the perception
construction stage is modelled further. An examination is carried out of
how those mismatches could be discovered, and of why many users fail
to do so.
3.4.1 How Mismatches Can Be Discovered
There are two types of mismatch: one concerns the participant, the other
concerns causality. The discovery of the mismatch of participant (refer
to section 3.3 for how we define the participant) mainly relies on the
information users select from the user interface. There are two types of
information presented to users at the interface:
• the metadata of the interaction; and
• the body of the interaction.
The metadata of the interaction is the data which systems use to identify
an entity. It can be used to form the space and participant aspects of the
perception. Example metadata includes the URL of the website, digital
certificates, and the sender’s email address. The body of the message is
used for conveying the semantic meaning of the interaction. It can be the
text content of an email message, webpage visual content, a video or an
audio clip.
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A participant mismatch can be revealed by discovering the inconsistency
between the body of the interaction and the metadata of the interaction.
For example the content of the phishing webpage suggests it is Ebay’s
website while the URL address suggests it is something else. The mis-
matches could be revealed if users selected both metadata and the body of
the interaction to form the perception. Users are good at understanding
the body of the interaction, however, many users may not possess suffi-
cient knowledge to understand the metadata of the interaction. Previous
user studies [21, 50] have also confirmed users’ lack of technical know-
ledge. To make the task of understanding the metadata of interaction
even harder, phishers often uses visual spoofing techniques to make the
metadata look like the counterpart of the impersonating targets. For
example, as shown in Table 3.1 phishers often use URL link manipulation
to make the URLs of the phishing websites look legitimate. As a result, a
lack of ability to understand the metadata of the interaction contributes
to users’ failure to discover participant mismatches.
Moreover, due to vulnerabilities in the system implementation and design,
the metadata could be spoofed to appear consistent with the body of the
interaction. For example, the sender’s email address could be configured
to display any email address the attacker wishes; an example is illustrated
in [49]. Rachna [21] has provided a list of techniques phishers use to spoof
metadata. As a result, to discover the mismatch of the participants, users
have to discover the inconsistency between the metadata and low level
system data that is not presented to users at the interface. For example, if
the attacker faked the sender’s address, which has not been associated
with a digital certificate, then users need to determine the original SMTP
server who sent out this email and compare it with the server from where
the email with the same email address is normally sent or investigate the
IP address from which the email has been sent. Another example is when
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Table 3.1: A Sample of Phishing Websites URLs
1 http://www.hsbc.com-ids-onlineserv-ssl-login-secure-id-user.
708210.12secure.com.tw-rock.org/creditcard/
2 http://myonlineaccounts2.abbeynational.co.uk.
dllstd.co.uk/CentralFormWeb/Form?action=
96096365480337710259369329228071531369410420215612
3 http://74.94.36.10/www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr=cmd=p/index.
php
4 http://www.ebay.cd.co.uk/eBayISAPI.dll?ViewItem&item=
150258354848&id=6
5 https://www.longin.com/Login?continue=http://www.google.com/
&hl=en
the phishing website’s URL address is spoofed2 to be identical with the
legitimate site. Unless users can analyse the IP address of the phishing
website as well as the IP address of the legitimate website, users cannot
discover the mismatch. Other examples also include caller ID spoofing
by using VoIP systems, which allow users to specify the outgoing call
number.
User education [73, 17, 18, 25, 30, 57, 62] has been used as a means to
protect users from phishing attacks. But to discover the mismatches when
meta-data is spoofed requires extra tools and knowledge which it would
seem unrealistic to expect many users to have. Such required knowledge
cannot be passed on to users without significant financial investment
and time. It is the system designer’s responsibility to ensure information
2A phishing attack that targets Citi Bank customers has used this technique. The story
is published at http://blog.washingtonpost.com
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displayed on the user interface is resistant enough against most spoofing
attacks, especially the meta-data. Furthermore, if designers of security
tools and indicators do not ensure their meta-data is reliable against
spoofing attacks, these tools may provide new avenues for phishers to
engineer more convincing false perceptions.
To discover mismatches of causality is difficult. Such mismatches will
be discovered if users are aware of certain contextual knowledge that
contradicts the story described in the body of the interaction. For the
phishing attack example illustrated in the Chapter 1, to discover the
mismatch the RBS customer needs to know how Lloyds TSB banking
group handle the existing bank accounts of HBOS customers or they need
to know Lloyds TSB would never contact them by email regarding such
an important issue. However, it is very unlikely many users have such
knowledge, especially users who have never been customers of Lloyds
TSB before. This phishing attack is sophisticated also because there is
considerable truth in its email. The truth in the phishing email is likely to
reduce the suspicion of users. There is another phishing attack for VISA
card holders. To make the online credit/debit card payment more secure
VISA has launched a "verified by visa" scheme. In this scheme users create
personal messages and passwords for their cards, and when they pay for
online purchases, users will be asked to provide the password as well as
the card details. Phishers have taken advantage of this scheme and send
users phishing emails which ask them to join this scheme if they have not
done so, although links provided in emails lead to phishing websites. In
this case, it would be very difficult to discover the mismatch of causality
unless users are aware of when VISA will send emails to its users and
what emails have been sent. Unlike a participant mismatch, a mismatch
of causality is not always discoverable from the user side, as users can
not be expected to possess the required contextual knowledge.
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3.4.2 Why Users Form False Perceptions and Fail to Discover
Mismatches
Users do not solve the actual problem nor respond to the actual situation,
they make decisions purely based on their perception [75]. Unsurprisingly,
in phishing attacks victims invariably perceive the situation erroneously
and solve the wrong problem. The victim’s response is flawlessly rational
according to the perception; he/she may execute an entirely cogent plan
to react to the perceived situation. The problem is, of course, that this
underpinning perception is simply wrong.
To answer the question why users form a false perception and fail to
discover the mismatches, researchers have tried to observe how users
behave in controlled user studies [21]. I feel this question can be answered
more completely and accurately by referring to the important steps illus-
trated in the graphical model of user-phishing interaction. The reasons
why users fail to execute each step correctly can provide answers to this
question, and they are:
• The selection of the information (especially metadata) is not suffi-
cient to construct an accurate perception to reveal mismatches of
participants;
• The information selected has not been interpreted correctly.
• Once engaged in the secondary decision making (regarding whether
to take the next planned action) users’ ability to construct an accur-
ate perception might drop because of early inaccurate/incomplete
expectations and less critical thinking generally.
77
Chapter 3 A Phishing-User Interaction Model
Insufficient Information
There are five causes for insufficient selection of information:
• metadata presented to users at the user interface is not sufficient;
• metadata presented at the user interface is vulnerable for spoofing
attacks;
• Users do not have the knowledge to allow them to select sufficient
information;
• Users have not paid enough attention to security and hence some
important information has not been selected;
• It is physically or mentally intolerable to select sufficient information
consistently.
Some user interfaces do not provide enough metadata information. For
example, in mobile phone communication, the caller’s ID can be hidden.
In the UK, banks or other organisations often call their customers without
displaying the phone number. The phishers can just call a customer to
impersonate legitimate organisations by hiding their phone number as
well. Even when the phone number is displayed, the users may still not
be sure of the identity of the caller, because there is still no information
(at the user interface) that can help them to decide who actually owns a
number. Here recognition of voice would not help because most likely
the user will not have built up a relationship with any specific caller from
that organisation (e.g a legitimate caller could be one of a considerable
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number in a call centre.)
If the metadata presented at the user interface level can be spoofed, then
users would be forced to select extra information to verify the metadata
displayed at the user interface. Often such additional information is
not provided to users at the interface. To access the extra information
requires more knowledge and skills which many users do not possess.
The sender’s email address is a prime example. That email address can
be set to any text string, and yet many users only select it to decide who
sent the email.
It is not only technical knowledge users are lacking. Contextual know-
ledge is also required in some cases. Some organisations and companies
share users’ information, and users can login to their accounts by using
any member’s websites. For example, these UK’s mobile phone retail
companies (CarPhoneWarehouse, E2save.com and Talktalk.com) share
their customer information, and users can use the same authentication
credentials to access their accounts at any one of the three websites. But
how could a user tell whether a site belongs to a legitimate organisation
or a phishing website by looking at the URL alone?
Users do not pay enough attention to security related meta-data; often
it is simply ignored. This may be because they are more interested in
productivity; they want to solve the problem and react to the situation as
efficiently as possible and security related metadata seem unrelated to
many users’ primary goals.
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Misinterpretation
The way people interpret the information selected is not error-free. I have
summarised biases within users’ interpretation of information [48, 50]:
• The existence of ‘HTTPS’ in the URL means the site is not a phishing
website and may be trusted. (HTTPS only indicates the use of
TLS/SSL protocol, phishing websites can use it too.)
• The appearance of the padlock at the bottom of the browser or
in the URL bar means that the web site visited is not a phishing
website and should be trusted. (The padlock only indicates secure
communication and it has nothing to do with the identity of the
website.)
• The appearance of the digital certificate means the site is secure
and should be trusted. (The phishing website can have a digital
certificate as well, it is the content of the digital certificates that
matters not the appearance.)
• The sender’s email address is trustworthy. (In reality it may be
spoofed.)
• The professional feeling of the page or email means it might come
from the legitimate source.
• Personalisation indicates security.
• Two URL’s whose semantic meanings are identical link to the same
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websites, for example www.mybank.com equals www.my-bank.com.
• The text of hyper link indicates the destination of the link.
• Emails are very phishy, web pages a bit, phone calls are not.
Besides the misinterpretation, some users also may not be able to interpret
the information presented to them at all. This is often the case for
some security warnings or error codes. If people do not understand
the information they receive, they will not be able to use it to form any
meaningful perception and discover the mismatches.
Drop in Perception Ability
In general, humans have been discovered to have information selection
bias during decision making. That is many people tend to select only the
information that confirms their existing perceptions and beliefs, and they
ignore information that contradicts them [41, 61, 75, 85]. Phishing has
taken advantage of this aspect of human nature, although this exploitation
may not be deliberate.
Phishing attacks first reach users via communication channels such as
email. It is at this stage where users will have to establish their initial
perception of the interaction. If a false perception is created, then it could
trigger information selection bias for the secondary decision making. As
a result, users are much less likely to pay attention to the information
passively presented by the meta-data and other security indicators. The
stronger the false perception is, the bigger the information selection
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bias could be. This human factor can very well explain why spear
phishing is more effective than just a random phishing email, as the
personalised information in spear phishing enhances the likelihood of a
false perception significantly. This human factor can also explain the result
of the user study by Serge Egelman et al [26], in which researchers found
that participants pay little attention to passive warnings on web browsers,
and only active warning messages have an effect if participants have
already constructed a false perception after reading phishing emails.
The drop in perception ability because of information selection bias in
secondary decision making is an important insight, and the understanding
of this aspect of human nature can be applied to help users discover
the mismatch of participants. The details will be discussed in the next
section.
3.5 Suggestions and Guidelines
3.5.1 Security Tools/Indicators Design
Security Indicators Should Be Put In the Right Place and At the Right
Time
In the interaction model the first step of decision making in each cycle
is to select available information, which will be the base for creating the
perception and deciding what action to take. So to provide users with
the right information in the right place and right time is vital to protect
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users from falling victim to phishing attacks.
There is little evidence to suggest that the difference between the two
types of decision making processes has been well understood by system
designers and security professionals. Little research has focused on
providing usable security indicators in email clients and other forms of
communication where the primary decision making takes place. Instead,
the focus has been mainly on improving the usability of authentication on
web pages where users decide whether to take the next planned action.
However, in secondary decision making, users’ ability to form accurate
perceptions is compromised by information selection bias. This may
explain why limited success has been achieved despite a number of tools
and indicators having been invented.
The security information presented to users by the user interface of
communication channels such as emails, phone calls, etc., is even more
important than those by web browsers in terms of helping users construct
an accurate perception, because those are the communication channels
where users’ initial perceptions of the interaction are created. At this
stage users have much less information selection bias and are more likely
to pay attention to the information presented to them by the security
tools/indicators. It is the best place to help users to discover the mismatch
of participants, because the system designers could take full advantage of
people’s ability to construct an accurate perception.
83
Chapter 3 A Phishing-User Interaction Model
Reduce the Burden On Users By Interpreting As Much Metadata As
Possible
In the interaction model, after selecting the information users need to
interpret the information. However, users may lack the knowledge to
interpret messages presented to them at the user interface. This should
be viewed as a design fault rather than the user’s problem. In such cases,
designers should ask the questions:
• What semantic information do users need to get?
• Can the system interpret the message for users so that the semantic
information is presented to them in the most intuitive way?
For example, users are found to lack the knowledge to interpret URLs to
understand who they are really interacting with [24]. A URL is a string
of characters used to represent the location of an entity on the Internet.
In server to user authentication, users are expected to confirm that they
are indeed visiting the web site that they intended to visit. They need
to parse the URL string in the URL address bar to obtain the identifier
of the web site (i.e. the domain). A URL has five major components
and ten sub–components, and different symbols are used to separate
those components. The syntax and structure of the URL is illustrated in
Figure 3.4.
Users without URL syntax education are likely to make mistakes in ex-
tracting identification information from a given URL, especially when the
URL string is deliberately formed to deceive them, as happens in phish-
ing and many other social engineering attacks on the Internet. Attackers
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manipulate the URL links to create URLs that look like the legitimate
counterpart, so that even when users do check the URLs they may still
fall victim. To fill this knowledge gap in a relatively short period of time
by user education is infeasible, because the population of users seeking
access to the web is becoming increasingly large and diverse. It is not
only expensive to educate them, but also difficult to reach them and get
their attention. However, this problem could be relatively easy to solve
by improving the design of how a URL string is displayed to user in URL
the address bar.
First, let us analyse the components of a URL and what they are used
for. A user’s task is to extract the identification information (often iden-
tifier of an entity) from the given URL. To whom a resource belongs is
identified by the domain, and optionally proved by a digital certificate.
Among the five components of the URL (scheme, authority, path, query
and fragment), only ‘authority’ contains the domain information. The
other four components are all parameters concerning the implementation
details of how the entity should be accessed.
‘Scheme’ specifies the communication protocol to be used, such as ‘Ftp’,
‘Http’ or ‘Https’, etc. ‘Userinfo’ is used to decide whether the current user
can access the requested resource. ‘Port’, ‘path’, ‘query’, and ‘fragment’
are all concerned with the implementation details of the remote server.
In addition, not all the strings contained in the hostname are relevant,
sub–domains can also be considered as implementation details of the
remote server; only the top level domain of the hostname should be
used as the identifier. It is clear that the data contained in the other four
components and the sub–domains are all data that are intended to be
read and processed between the web browser on the client side and the
server rather than by general users. If the users do not need them, can
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the URL address bar just hide them from users? Two important software
engineering principles are encapsulation and data hiding, as they provide
much clearer readability and usability. Can the same principles be applied
here?
When the web browser was invented, most of its users were technical
users such as research scientists. The navigation of the Internet was
mainly based on the manual input of URLs into the address bar. To do
so, users often had to remember the URLs of important entities, and
those users were expected to have sufficient knowledge to understand
the syntax of URLs. As a result the URL is displayed as it is without any
processing. However, the user groups have changed dramatically; now
technical users are a minority, and the most common navigation method
is to use a search engine (in this case there is no need to read the URL of a
resource and remember it). Even when users do enter URLs directly, they
are normally very short. As a result the main use of a URL has shifted to
help users identify the identity of a resource. Would it not therefore be
better if the web browser does the interpretation work for the users and
hides the irrelevant implementation details from users as default, and
lets technical users choose if they still want the URL to displayed as it
is? Users can still input the URL in the same way, the difference is that
after the URL has been typed in and processed, the URL address bar then
hides unnecessary information. General users would no longer require
knowledge to interpret the URL syntax and there would be much less
room for attackers to play their link manipulation tricks.
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3.5.2 Evaluation of User Interfaces
Current evaluations [71, 77, 88] of user interfaces have mainly focused on
whether the users can select sufficient information provided to them at
the interface and how well they can interpret the information presented
to them. From our model we can see why those two aspects are very
important, but two aspects seem to have received insufficient attention by
researchers:
• whether the information provided at the interface can be tampered
with by attackers. If so, then it is also important to check whether
users can get alternative information sources to verify the informa-
tion displayed at the user interface;
• whether the user interface provides enough metadata for users to
accurately define the participants of the interaction.
The first addresses whether users will have correct information to make
decisions. If the information used in the decision is wrong, how can
users form accurate perceptions and discover mismatches? The second
examines whether users have enough information to choose from. As
discussed in the model, it is not that straightforward to decide what
is sufficient information. Unreliable information displayed at the user
interface needs more information to verify it and this increases the total
information needed. If users do not have enough information to consider,
forming accurate perceptions is impossible and exploitable mismatches
will not be detected.
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3.5.3 User Education
Most existing phishing user education research [73, 17, 18, 25, 30, 57, 62]
is focused on helping users detect phishing attacks. Users are generally
taught what existing phishing attacks look like via real and artificial
examples, and the most common spoofing techniques used. Users are
given guidelines to follow, such as: never click on URL links embedded
in emails; do not trust URLs containing IP addresses, etc. However,
phishing attacks are constantly evolving, they may use novel tricks or
may be launched over communication media the user does not associate
with phishing. Such education may improve the chances for users to
detect the known phishing attacks, but it fails for the more sophisticated or
unknown attacks. With more and more techniques available to attackers,
the guidelines and blacklists would eventually become too complicated
to follow. If users’ education is too close to the current phishing attack
techniques, and the techniques change then users may be more vulnerable
than before.
Rather than injecting a new step, detection, into a user’s behaviour model,
we should focus on educating users to form an accurate perception when
interacting with computing systems by:
• teaching them the sufficient set of information they should select in
different context;
• teaching them how to correctly interpret the information selected.
• training users to have more complete/accurate expectations.
89
Chapter 3 A Phishing-User Interaction Model
In this way users will have a better chance of discovering the mismatches
we discussed earlier. By teaching users how to more accurately form
perceptions, they can now protect themselves against both known and
unknown attacks. This approach is also simple and independent from
changing attacking techniques, and most importantly this approach is
more likely to have consistent results as it does not change the funda-
mental model of how users interact with computing systems.
My model also suggests there are distinct limits to what can be achieved
by education. User education improves only how accurately users form
perceptions with the information available. The sufficiency and reliability
of the information also affect the perceptions users construct, and those
two aspects can only be addressed from a technical point of view. If
reliable and sufficient information is not available, users cannot construct
accurate perceptions and may still fall victim to phishing attacks. But it is
wrong to blame users for security compromises and to tar them as "the
weakest link" of security. As designers of security products and systems,
we have been accessories to the crime!
3.6 Discussion
In this chapter I have introduced a user-phishing interaction model from
a decision making point of view. This model is used to analyse how users
can detect phishing attacks and discuss why users often fail to do so.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there is also a model of phishing
deception detection proposed by Wright et al [87] based on the model of
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deception detection by Grazioli [37]. Wright’s model focuses on how a
deception could be discovered from the user’s point of view. It focused
on the user side and ignored the influence of the system interface on
the outcome of the communication. As a result, the potential counter-
measures followed by his model would be improve users’ web experience
and educate users to be more suspicious. These suggestions are well
motivated, but were known before the introduction of this model. This
model also has limited use for system designers in terms of how to design
secure but also usable interfaces.
Another important limitation of Wright’s model is that it does not consider
the fact that user-phishing interaction comprises a series of actions; there
may be several decisions users need to make and users’ ability to detect
deception may not be the same at different stages of the interaction.
(Wright’s paper did, however, state that the participants are more likely
to detect deception during interaction with phishing emails than with
phishing web pages.)
In contrast, the model described in this chapter captures the whole user-
phishing interaction in an objective manner with equal emphasis on both
users and information available at the user interface. It is based on the
analysis of user behaviours in reported phishing attacks and established
decision making theory. It could be a powerful, reliable predicative tool
for security practitioners and system designers.
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Threat Modelling
This chapter introduces methods to identify, and assess user-related
vulnerabilities within internet based user authentication systems. The
methods described in this chapter can be used as an addition to risk
assessment processes such as the one described by ISO 27001 [5].
4.1 Introduction
Threat modelling is a tool to identify, minimize and mitigate security
threats at the system design stage. However, most existing threat mod-
elling methods appear to give little in the way of systematic analysis
concerning the user’s behaviours. If users are now the “weakest link”
then user-side threat modelling is as important as system-side threat
modelling. In this chapter, a threat modelling technique for internet
based user authentication systems is described. To improve practicability,
the technique is designed to be quantifiable, and can be easily integrated
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into one of the most prominent security and risk management methods
described in ISO/IEC 27001 [5].
4.2 Overview Of The Method
The method comprises the four steps listed below. The method presented
here has similarities with the overall threat modelling approaches of
ISO27001 [5], but seeks to provide user centred threat interpretation.
1. Asset identification: identify all the valuable assets (authentica-
tion credentials which can be used to prove a user’s identity) that
attackers might obtain from users.
2. Threat Identification: identify threats the authentication creden-
tials (assets) face based on the properties of these authentication
credentials.
3. Vulnerability and risk level assessment: for each threat identified
apply the corresponding vulnerability analysis technique to reveal
the potential vulnerabilities and associated risk levels.
4. Threat mitigation: determine the countermeasures for each vulner-
ability identified. (This step is not within the scope of my research
and how to determine countermeasures will not be discussed here.)
The terms threats and attacks are over-used. To help readers better
understand the method, it is necessary to explain what these terms mean
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here. I define threat as the possibility of an event that has some negative
impact to the security of the system happening. An attack is a means
through which a threat is realised. An attack is possible only if certain
vulnerabilities exist in the system.
The threat modelling method described in this chapter takes an assets-
centric (authentication credentials in this case) approach rather than the
system-centric or attack-centric approaches. Authentication credentials
are simple to identify, small in quantity, and can be an ideal focal point to
conduct threat modelling. The foundation for system–centric approaches
is knowledge of the implementation of the system and how it operates.
Such an approach is not suitable when users are involved, because we do
not possess sufficient knowledge to accurately predict users behaviours in
all possible conditions. The attack–centric approach could be too complex
given there are so many existing types of attacks and new ones emerge all
the time as attackers are constantly adapting their techniques to increase
success rates and avoid detection.
The assets-centric approach itself is not the author’s original contribution.
Rather, the contribution is a demonstration of how this approach can
be applied to analyse the user related threats. For instance, how to
identify and classify the assets, how to use the properties of the assets
to identify vulnerabilities etc. The method described in this chapter
should be also viewed as a supplement to the standard risk assessment
processes described by ISO 27001. With the addition of this method,
security professionals can still use the process they are familiar with to
address the user-related vulnerabilities.
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4.3 Asset Identification
All authentication credentials should be identified and grouped into sets,
where each set can be used independently to prove a user’s identity. If
some credentials together can prove a user’s identify to a server, then
they should be grouped into one set. In general there are more than
one set of user authentication credentials for each user account. The
vulnerabilities and their associated risk levels identified by our method
are specific to each authentication credential set. If any authentication
credentials have been missed in this step, so are the associated threats
and vulnerabilities.
It is simple to identify the authentication credentials such as user name
and password that are used in the normal interaction between users
and systems. (We call this set of authentication credentials primary
authentication credentials.) Authentication credentials that are used in
special cases are likely to be missed. Special cases include authentication
during recovery/resetting of primary authentication credentials, and
also authentication on communication channels other than the Internet.
Some authentication credentials are also implicit, for example access to a
secondary email account. It is very common that when someone forgets
the primary password, he/she can get a new password sent to a chosen
email account after answering a series of security questions correctly. In
these cases, the access to the secondary email account should be also
considered as a means of proving the user’s identity. As a result, together
with the security questions, the secondary email account should also be
identified. In this method, the user identifier should also be treated as an
authentication credential.
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For each identified set of credentials, we recommend they be represen-
ted in the following way: { Identifier :: C1, C2, .. Cn } The identifier
uniquely identifies a user in the given authentication system (the same id
may identify a different user in another system), Ci represents a single
authentication credential data item, such as a PIN or a password. The
identifier may not always exist for the set whose members are not primary
authentication credentials. Examples can be found in the case studies
described in section 4.6 and section 4.7.
4.4 Threat Identification
Threat identification is based on the properties of the authentication
credentials, which we will introduce first. Then we describe how to
use those properties to discover the threats each set of authentication
credentials faces.
4.4.1 Properties Of Users’ Authentication Credentials
The approach requires that several properties of authentication credentials
be identified and considered. The particular property value of authentic-
ation credentials affects which threats their use may be subject to. Five
properties are given below. These properties affect, for example, which
threats are relevant, how/who generates authentication credentials, as
well as how they are shared and communicated.
• Factor;
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• Assignment;
• Directness;
• Memorability;
• Communication channel;
Factor something users know (KNO) ; something users possess (POS);
something users have access to (ACC); or characteristics of who
users are (ARE).
‘Something users have access to’ is usually classified as ‘something
users possess’. It is distinguished because it has different implic-
ations for the security of an authentication system: it creates a
security dependency relationship. Such authentication credentials
are not directly possessed by a user, but the user holds the keys
(authentication credentials) to access them. These credentials are
managed and possessed by third parties, and their compromise can
lead to the compromise of the concerned authentication credentials.
For example, access to a secondary email account is often used as
an authentication credential, it should be treated as ACC rather
than POS. The email accounts are possessed and managed by email
account providers and users only have access to them. A security
breach on the email account can lead to the compromise of the
studied authentication system, and the security of the email account
is not within the control of the studied authentication system.
‘Something users know’ refers to a piece of information that users
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remember (e.g. a password), while ‘something users possess’ refers
to a physical object that users hold (e.g. a USB key, a SIM card).
‘Who users are’ refers to properties which can be used to describe
the identity of a user, typical examples are: biometric data such as
finger print, facial appearance of the user, etc.
Assignment by the server; by the user; or by a third party.
Assignment by the system can ensure that certain security require-
ments are met (for example, that values of the authentication cre-
dentials are unique, and difficult to guess). A user may not find the
value assigned by the system usable. User defined values may have
high usability, but the system has limited control over whether ne-
cessary security requirements are met. When the value is assigned
by a third party, the security properties depend on the behaviour
of the third party. If the value of the authentication credential is
predictable or easy to replicate, then this vulnerability could lead to
the compromise of the current system.
Directness direct or indirect.
This indicates what messages are exchanged between the user and
the server: ‘direct’ means the authentication credential itself (includ-
ing the encryption of the authentication credential) is exchanged;
‘indirect’ means a special message, which only the authentication
credential is capable of producing, is exchanged, e.g., a response in
a challenge which only can be solved by the holder of a secret.
Memorability high, medium or low.
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Table 4.1: Property Relevance Table
Factor Assignment Directness Memorability CC
KNO Yes Yes Yes Yes
POS Yes Yes No Yes
ACC Yes No No No
ARE No Yes No Yes
This indicates how easy the value of an authentication credential is
to remember.
Communication Channels (CC) open or closed.
This indicates whether the media or communication channels over
which credentials are to be exchanged is implemented using agents
that are not controlled and protected by the authentication server.
For example the Internet is an open CC, because the user’s machine,
local routers, DNS servers and etc. are not controlled and protected
by any authentication server.
The property identification process starts by identifying the factor on
which the credential is based, then the factor property decides what prop-
erties to consider. Table 4.1 shows what properties should be considered
for each factor. Finally for authentication credentials whose directness
is ‘direct’, then the communication channel property needs to be con-
sidered.
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4.4.2 Threat Identification Predicates
To determine the threats a credential faces one can apply its properties to
a series of logical predicates we define. Currently there are three threat
predicates identified :
server impersonated (SIT) This represents the threat that attackers imper-
sonate a trustworthy server entity that has a genuine need for the
authentication credentials, to elicit the authentication credentials
from users. Phishing and Pharming attacks are typical examples of
attacks that can realise this threat.
disclosure by users (DUT) This represents the threat that the authentica-
tion credentials are unwittingly disclosed by the users, where no
deception is involved.
disclosure by a third party (DTPT) This represents the threat of disclosure
of a user’s authentication credentials because of security breaches
of a third party.
Before we present the predicates we developed, we describe the basic
syntax used to express them:
X :: the current authentication credential being considered
X · Property :: the value of the corresponding property
X ∈ SIT/DUT/DTPT :: means X faces the given threat
X ⇒ Y When X is true then Y is true
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The predicates to identify the potential threats are as following:
(X · CC ≡ open)
∧ (X · Directness ≡ direct) ⇒ X ∈ SIT
((X · Factor ≡ KNO) ∧ (X ·Memorability 6= high))
∨ (X · Factor ≡ ARE)
∨ (X · Assignment ≡ user)
⇒ X ∈ DUT
(X · Factor ≡ ACC)
∨ (X · Assignment ≡ thirdparty) ⇒ X ∈ DTPT
Using the predicates and the properties of authentication credential we
can determine the potential threats to it. Each member of a given au-
thentication credential set may face different threats. The threats that all
members face take the highest priority in the next two steps, because a
single attack realising the common threat could compromise the whole
set. If an authentication credential set does not have a common threat,
then it would take a combination of attacks realising various threats to
compromise the whole lot. This also suggests an important authentication
system design principle: members of a set of authentication credentials
should be chosen with the consideration that they do not face a common
threat; if a common threat can not be avoided, then designers should at
least try to minimize the common threats that the set of authentication
credentials faces. Following this principle could significantly increase the
difficulty of obtaining the whole set of user authentication credentials.
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The threats are identified by considering all attack examples collected.
Although attempts have been made to be as comprehensive as possible,
there might be threats that are not yet addressed by our predicates. To
identify those missing threats one can easily create the predicate that is
needed on the nature of the threat. In this Chapter our focus is about
the methodology, not about the completeness of the threats identification
predicates. The more the method is used, the more we expect to identify
new predicates.
4.5 Vulnerabilities and Risk Level Analysis
There are two methods to determine the vulnerabilities and the risk levels
for each identified threat, the choice of the method depends on whether
the threat can be realised during a user-system interaction or not. In
the former case (we will refer it as the user-system interaction case) we
analyse the relevant user interface and system features, and in the other
case (we will refer it as the security policy case) we examine the relevant
security policies and security assumptions placed onto users. For the
three threats described in the previous section, only SIT is user-system
interaction case and the other two are security policy cases.
4.5.1 User-system Interaction Case
To discover the vulnerabilities that could be exploited to impersonate
authentication servers, one has to identify all the use cases where authen-
tication credentials are exchanged. We provide a method to help analysts
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Figure 4.1: The Life Cycle of Authentication Credentials
consistently identify them with the help of an authentication credential
life-cycle. Then for each use case, analysts can apply what is termed
here the “user behaviour analysis” technique to uncover the potential
vulnerabilities and associated risk levels.
The Life Cycle Of Authentication Credentials
Figure 4.1 shows states in the life cycle of authentication credentials and
the transitions between them. The oval represents states. The optional
state and transitions between states are represented by dashed lines.
Following is the description of the states:
Design: Designers decide three things in this state : over which commu-
nication channel the authentication will be carried out; what authentica-
tion credentials should be used; and their life cycle. The design should
consider the requirements for security, usability, economic constraints and
the properties of the authentication credentials (described in Section 4.4.1).
Threat modelling should also be carried out in this state.
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Assignment: This state determines the value(s) of the authentication
credential(s) for a particular user. Once this state completes, only the party
who conducted the assignment knows the value of the credential(s). For
example, in an authentication system where password, one time password
generated by a USB key, and user name are used as the authentication
credentials, these actions will be implemented by both users and servers.
Users carry out the action to decide what the user name and password
will be, while servers run a program to create a secret, and then store
the secret in the USB key. In some cases this action can be completed
almost instantly, for example if biometrics such as finger prints, facial
appearance or voice are chosen.
Synchronisation: This state starts when user authentication credentials
are assigned and ends when both user and server are capable of executing
the user authentication process. During this stage, the party who assigned
the value informs the other party of the value it has chosen. The time
taken varies with the communication channel used. If users supply
credential values via web pages then synchronisation could be almost
immediate and the authentication credentials will be transitioned to other
stages. For credentials exchanged by the postal system (e.g. a PIN for
a new cash point card, or a USB token), then the synchronisation could
take a few days. Sometimes when biometric information is used, users
may need to travel to a certain location to securely give such information
to the server.
Activation: Some systems may require users to take action to activate
authentication credentials before they can be used. For example, it is not
unusual to have to telephone a number to activate a banking account.
Operation: Users supply their primary authentication credentials to
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authenticate themselves to external entities.
Suspension: The current authentication credentials temporarily cease
to function, e.g. ‘lockout’ after three failed authentication attempts.
Upon satisfying certain requirements authentication credentials can be
transitioned to other stages.
Termination: Here current authentication credentials permanently cease
to function. The account may have been terminated by the system or the
user.
A given authentication system may not have all the states and actions
mentioned. The activation action and suspension state are optional. Any
authentication credential should pass through the remaining actions and
states. Transitions between states may vary greatly for different authentic-
ation credentials. A typical authentication credential’s life cycle starts at
the design state before moving to assignment and synchronisation. De-
pending on the actual authentication system, there might be an activation
action before the operation state. From operation it can reach: suspension,
termination, assignment, and synchronisation. It often reaches assign-
ment because the user or system decides to reset the current value of the
authentication credentials. Not every system allows authentication cre-
dentials to transition from operation to synchronisation. But when it does,
it is often due to loss of authentication credentials. For example, when a
user forgets his password, the user asks the system to send him/her the
password or a link that enables such a password to be established.
Using the life cycle, the following six situations have been identified where
a user’s authentication credentials could be exchanged: 1) Synchronisation
State; 2) Operation State; 3) state transition from Operation to Assignment;
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4) state transition from Operation to Synchronisation; 5) state transition
from suspension to assignment; 6) state transition from suspension to
operation. In practice an analyst does not need to consider the life-cycle
of the authentication credential, they just need only to consider the six
cases to find all use cases.
Vulnerability Analysis
The “user behaviour analysis” technique is based on the user-phishing
interaction model described in chapter 3. In this model the interaction
between user and system can be decomposed into a cycle of user’s actions,
and decisions. The interaction ends either when the interaction reaches
its natural conclusion or when users discover they are being attacked.
For each use case, analysts should use such an interaction model to
describe the user-system interaction and decompose each use case into a
series of security related user actions and decisions. For each action and
decision the analyst then considers whether the vulnerabilities described
in Table 4.2 exist. The vulnerabilities in the table are derived using the
vulnerabilities proposed in [23, 53]. The judgement of the vulnerabilities
caused by non-technical factors can be subjective, however, the analyst
should always think from a worst case perspective and make decisions
accordingly.
4.5.2 Security Policy Case
Analysts should first find out the security policy which has been put in
place to deal with the concerned threat as well as the assumptions re-
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Table 4.2: Vulnerability Table for User Action and User Decision (adapted
from [23, 53])
Apply To Description
USV–A1 User action Users are unable to understand which security
security actions are required of them.
USV–A2 User action Important security actions required are not en-
forced by the system design.
USV–A3 User action Users do not have the knowledge or skills to
retrieve sufficient information to make the right
security decision.
USV–A4 User action The mental and physical load of a security ac-
tion is not sustainable.
USV–A5 User action The mental and physical load of carrying out re-
peated security actions for any practical number
of instances is not sustainable.
USV–D1 User decision Users do not have sufficient knowledge to inter-
pret the message presented to them at the user
interface.
USV–D2 User decision The system does not provide the user with suffi-
cient information for making the right security
decision.
USV–D3 User decision The mental load of making the correct security
decision is not sustainable.
USV–D4 User decision The mental load of making the correct security
decision for any practical number of instances
is not sustainable.
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Table 4.3: Vulnerability Table for Security Policy
USV–P1 Users are not aware of the security policy.
USV–P2 The system designers’ assumption of what users would do
is unrealistic or users can not obey the security policy due
to the lack of knowledge, capabilities or other resources.
USV–P3 The security policy or assumption contradicts the current
social context, common sense, and users’ common beha-
viours
USV–P4 The security policy or assumption contradicts other systems’
security policies.
USV–P5 The security policy is counter-productive for users’ primary
needs.
USV–P6 The assumption is wrong or users can not obey the security
policy consistently over a long period of time because the
mental and physical load of doing so is not sustainable.
garding how users would protect and use their authentication credentials.
They should then check whether any of the vulnerabilities described in
Table 4.3 exist in the studied system. The second step is subjective, but
we recommend that analysts should take a worst case approach.
The following example can be used to explain USV–P3. Because of the
popularity of social networking sites and web 2.0/3.0 sites, personal
information such as name, address, and date of birth are becoming
publicly displayed on the Internet. If the security policy requires users to
keep such information private, then this security policy contradicts the
current social context and users’ common behaviours. As a result, this
security policy is very likely to be breached.
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USV–P4 holds if the security policy or assumptions differ from those
of other systems. Any difference is likely to cause confusion and users
will find it difficult to decide which policy should be obeyed in any
particular situation. For example, to stop phishing attacks some financial
organizations tell their customers that they will never send emails to
them, while other organizations (especially Internet based banks) use
email as a primary channel to inform offers or news to its customers. For
a user of both types of organization, confusions may easily arise.
USV–P5 and USB–P6 are the result of lack of usability; they often lead
users to cut corners or simply ignore the given security policy. They often
exist at the same time. For example, the user authentication system for
accessing the UK grid computing system requires each user to hold its
own digital certificate and a strong password. Users are asked not to
share these authentication credentials and to keep them secret. However,
such certificates take a couple weeks to obtain, and applicants must bring
their ID document to a local centre. Researchers often need to collaborate
with international colleagues who cannot apply the certificates with ease.
Some researchers may suddenly find that they need to use the grid
computing resource to complete an important experiment. Many of them
are reluctant to go through the lengthy application. To make their life
easier many researchers share certificates and passwords. In some cases, a
group of researchers may use the same authentication credentials. Given
the diversity and mobility of the workforce, it is very easy to lose track
of who has access to a certain authentication credential. It is easy for a
malicious attacker to obtain those authentication credentials.
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4.5.3 Risk Level Estimate
The risk level assessment is conventionally carried out by considering the
difficulty of exploiting a vulnerability, the impact of the exploit, and the
likelihood of the exploit. When the human aspect is considered, two extra
factors also need to be put into equation:
Diversity within the targeted user group Each user has different know-
ledge, skills and behaviours. The knowledge of concern here relates
to system implementation and security. Because of such differences, a
vulnerability may apply to some users but not others.
Inconsistency and unpredictability of each individual user’s behaviour
A user’s abilities and behaviours do not remain the same. Emotional state,
physical conditions, current priorities, training and education may all
affect a user’s behaviours. Hence, a vulnerability may not always apply
to the same user.
For each vulnerability I associate two probabilities Pu and Pi for these
two factors. Pu represents the portion of the user group to whom this
vulnerability applies, while Pi represents the probability that a vulnerable
user falls victim to the attack on any one occasion. Since it is very difficult
to measure the actual values for Pu and Pi, qualitative scale values: high
(H), medium(M), and low(L) are used. Pu is high means the user group
are very diverse in terms of ability and knowledge. There are five risk
levels: Very High (5), High (4), Medium (3), Low (2), Very Low (1).
Table 4.4 indicates how to determine the risk level. The first column
of the table indicates how difficult it is to exploit the vulnerability and
the second column(‘Yes’ and ‘NO’) indicates whether the exploitation
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Table 4.4: Risk Level Assessment Table
Pu ≡ H Pu ≡ M Pu ≡ L
P i
≡
H
P i
≡
M
P i
≡
L
P i
≡
H
P i
≡
M
P i
≡
L
P i
≡
H
P i
≡
M
P i
≡
L
Difficult
Yes 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 3 3
No 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
Not Difficult
Yes 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4
No 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 1
of the vulnerability would lead to the compromise of the whole set of
authentication credentials. For example, the top left cell means the risk
level is very high (5) as the vulnerability is difficult to exploit but it can
lead to the compromise of the whole set of authentication credentials and
Pi and Pu are both high.
The values in Table 4.4 are chosen based on the security requirements for
the user authentication system which will be discussed in case studies.
In practice one could adjust the values in this table based on the security
requirements of the system been analysed. This table is a framework
for risk level assessment. This framework ensures the risk assessment
process is consistent and comprehensive. It is also recommended that if
the risk level is higher than medium, mitigation of such vulnerabilities
should be considered. So when adjusting the values in this table, one
should consider the above suggestion as well.
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4.6 Case Study One
We illustrate the approach with reference to a case study based on the
current online user authentication system used by one of the UK’s largest
retail banks. This demonstrates that the proposed method can be ap-
plied to discover serious threats and vulnerabilities in a consistent and
systematic manner.
4.6.1 Assets Identification
There are three sets of user authentication credentials, and they are:
• Set A: { user id :: password , memorable word }
• Set B: { :: first name, last name, birth date, sort code, account
number}
• Set C: { user id :: first name, last name, birth date }
Set A is used in primary authentication to allow access to the internet
banking facilities, set B is used to retrieve the forgotten user id used in Set
A and set C is used to reset the password and the memorable word used
in set A. Set B is an example where a set of authentication credentials
does not have an identifier, instead the all members of the set can be used
to uniquely identify the account holder.
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4.6.2 Threat Identification
Properties
Obtaining the properties for the authentication credentials in the three
sets is simple and the results are shown in the Table 4.5, Table 4.6, and
Table 4.7. The authentication credentials are exchanged via the Internet.
We regard it as an unsecured communication channel despite the encryp-
tion used, because the platform users used to browse the internet could
be compromised as could the security of the middle layer agents such as
local router, DNS server etc.
Identifying the value for some properties can be subjective, for example,
memorabilities. In those cases, practitioners should assume a worst case
scenario.
Threats
Applying the properties of those authentication credentials we can identify
the threats each authentication credentials face. The results are shown in
Table 4.8, Table 4.9, and Table 4.10
In conclusion, all members in the three sets of authentication credentials
face SIT, and DUT. The attacks realizing either threat can compromise the
whole set of authentication credentials and allow attackers to impersonate
the user. The vulnerabilities and risk levels associated with them must
be analysed. The results (shown in Table 4.8, Table 4.9, and Table 4.10)
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highlight the vulnerabilities in the authentication system design. In
particular, members of the authentication credential set share at least
two threats. As a result, a single attack exploiting either threat can
compromise the whole set of authentication credentials. This constitutes
a “single point of failure”. In many areas of dependability, “designing
out” single point of failure is the norm. Here this approach has merit.
Removing or reducing the common threats will generally reduce risk.
Secure design should try to make sure that there are no threats (or at least
very few) common to the set of all member authentication credentials.
Fewer common threats means that fewer attacks could compromise all
members at once and increases the difficulty for attackers to obtain the
information they want.
4.6.3 Vulnerabilities And Risk Levels
Only the SIT requires user-system interaction, and the DUT is dealt with
by security policy.
User Behaviour Analysis
As described earlier, this analysis technique starts by identifying the use
cases where authentication credentials are exchanged, and then discovers
what user security actions and decisions need to be made in those use
cases. Finally we analyse whether vulnerabilities exist in those actions
and decisions.
First let’s identify the use cases by reference to the six possible cases
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described in section 4.5.1. For set A, the authentication credentials are
exchanged via user-system interaction for the following cases: synchron-
ization (during reset) and operation states. In the two use cases users are
supposed to take security actions to decide whether they are interacting
with the legitimate website. For sets B and C, the authentication cre-
dentials are exchanged only during the operation state. In all identified
cases the authentication credentials are exchanged via the Internet at the
bank’s website, and the security mechanisms used for the server to user
authentication system are the same. As a result the security user action
and decision models are also the same in all cases. Hence, we need only
analyse one case to identify all the vulnerabilities and risk levels.
The bank’s website uses the Extended Validated Certificate (EVC) as the
means to provide reliable server to user authentication. The required
users actions are: read the certificate image displayed in the URL address
bar (action 1); and read the URL string displayed in the URL address bar
(action 2). The user decisions to be made are:
• determine whether the current website belongs to the bank by using
the information displayed by the certificate image (decision 1);
• determine whether the current website belongs to the bank by
interpreting the URL string (decision 2).
Since there is no mechanism to make sure action 1 is taken by users
before user authentication can begin, it is obvious that it has vulnerability
USV-A2. This vulnerability is not difficult to exploit and it could lead to
the compromise of the whole set of authentication credentials. Since the
users of the online banking are the general public and it is certain that
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not many users possess appropriate technical skills and knowledge, both
the Pu and Pi at least should be medium. By referring to the Table 4.4, we
can decide that the risk level is at least high (4).
The EVC is the replacement for the conventional TSL certificate which has
been proved ineffective in providing usable server to user authentication.
The EVC requires users to read the text displayed and the colour of the
certificate image. Although it might be much more usable and more
resilient against spoofing attacks, it requires users to understand the
difference between a conventional TSL certificate and the EVC to achieve
the desired result. However, it would be unrealistic to assume that the
majority of users hold the required knowledge. Users without such
knowledge may not understand what the colour of the digital certificate
means and what the lack of colour on it means. Users have proven
poor at noticing missing components in the user interface [26, 77]. As
a result the action 2 also has USV-A1 and USV-A3. Both vulnerabilities
are easy to exploit and could lead to the compromise of the whole set
of authentication credentials. The Pu for both vulnerabilities is high, as
most users still do not possess the required knowledge, while Pi should
be at least medium. So the risk level for both USV-A1 and USV-A3 in
action 2 is very High (5). Although both vulnerabilities and risk levels
are not static, the risk level would drop if more users had the required
knowledge and the vulnerability could disappear if majority of users
were aware of EVC. For the same reason mentioned here, decision 1 has
USV-D1 and its risk level is very high (5).
As with action 1, action 2 also has USV-A2 with the same risk level.
Many user studies have shown that users are aware that they need to
check the URL of the website during the server to user authentication
[24, 48], it does not have USV-A1 and USV-A3. Decision 2 has USV-D1,
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because only users with knowledge of how URL syntax works know how
to interpret a given URL to find out the top level domain name. Using
the top level domain name, a user can then decide whether the current
website is legitimate of not. Many users do not have such knowledge.
The above analysis also suggests that the Pu and Pi are both high, so the
risk level for USV-D1 is very high (5). Decision 2 also has USV-D3 and
USV-D4. Many URLs of the legitimate web pages are complex and long.
Even worse for users is that the phishing websites would deliberately
make their URLs more complex and longer in order to cheat the victims.
Occasionally careful examination of a URL to determine with whom the
user is interacting will be tolerable, but frequent detailed examinations
will not. Alos, most examination efforts are not necessary (most websites
users interact with are legitimate). USV-D3 and USV-D4 are also very
high (5).
Security Policy Vulnerability Analysis
As threat identification has revealed that the bank’s authentication sys-
tem faces DUT. The bank has told its users that they should keep the
authentication secret and not share them with anyone.
The authentication credential set A requires a user to remember an online
banking ID, a password and a memorable word. The ID is a 8 digit
number which holds no meaning for users and can be difficult to remem-
ber. The password is any combination of 6 - 15 letters and/or numbers,
while the memorable word must contain between 6 and 15 characters
with no spaces and contain both letters and numbers. The three pieces of
information together might be difficult to remember for some users and
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as a result they could write them down or store them externally. Once
they have done that they risk the information being exposed to attackers;
as a result we consider that it has USV–P2. This vulnerability is difficult
for attackers to exploit systematically, although it can still lead to the
compromise of the whole set of authentication credentials. The Pu is low
and Pi is high, so its risk level is medium (3).
The sets B and C do not have USV–P2, but they do have USV–P3 and
this is much more serious. The first name, last name, and date of birth
are no longer secret. Such information may openly be displayed on
social network web pages, personal blogs, etc. Users are not reluctant
to give away such information and indeed many web sites ask users for
them. Such personal information is also no secret to a user’s friends and
relatives. The account number and sort code is not secret either. People
often given those information to others when they want to exchange
money from their bank account, e.g. paying rent, share bill, loan, etc. The
difficulty of exploiting this vulnerability depends on whether the attacker
has a relationship with the victim or not, if they have then it is very easy
otherwise could be difficult. Both Pu and Pi are high, so the risk level
can be very high (5) for insiders(attackers who have relationships with
victims) or high (4) for normal attackers.
It is quite surprising that the authentication system has such a serious
vulnerability. As a result, insiders, such as the user’s friend, colleagues
or family member can easily get hold of the required authentication
credentials to access the user’s online banking account.
119
Chapter 4 Threat Modelling
4.7 Case Study Two
In the second case study we analyse the user authentication system of
Ebay. Ebay’s customers are frequently targeted by phishing attackers, as
a result one would assume their authentication system should be robust
by now.
4.7.1 Assets Identification
For each user there are three sets of authentication credentials, and they
are:
• Set A: { user id :: password}
• Set B: { email address :: access to the email address }
• Set C: { user id:: answers to a preset security question, post code,
telephone number, birthdate }
Set A contains the primary authentication credentials. Set B is used
to retrieve the user id used in the set A, and set C is used to reset the
password used in set A. The compromise of either set B and C can not give
attackers access to the account. There are six different security questions
users could choose in set C and they are:
• What street did you grow up on?
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• What is your mother’s maiden name?
• What is your maternal grandmother’s name?
• What is your first girlfriend/boyfriend’s last name?
• What is the name of your first school?
• What is your pet’s name?
4.7.2 Threat Identification
Properties
The properties for the authentication credentials in the three sets are
shown in the Table 4.11, Table 4.12, and Table 4.13.
Threats
Considering the properties of those authentication credentials we can
identify the threats that each authentication credential faces. The results
are shown in Table 4.14, Table 4.15, and Table 4.16
121
Chapter 4 Threat Modelling
4.7.3 Vulnerabilities And Risk Levels
Authentication credentials in set A , Band C are all facing SIT, and Set A
and C are also facing DUT. The access to the email account in set B also
faces DTPT.
User Behaviour Analysis
With reference to the six possible cases described in section 4.5.1, we can
identify the following use cases for the three sets of authentication cre-
dentials. First for set A, the authentication credentials are exchanged via
user-system interaction for the following cases: synchronization (during
reset) and operation states. In these two use cases users are supposed to
decide whether they are interacting with the legitimate website. For sets
B and C, the authentication credentials are also exchanged in the opera-
tion and synchronization states. In all identified cases the authentication
credentials are exchanged via the Internet at the Ebay’s website, and the
security mechanisms used for the server to user authentication system
are the same. As a result the security user action and decision models
are also the same in all cases, hence, we need only to analyse one case to
identify all the vulnerabilities and risk levels.
The Ebay’s website uses the Extended Validated Certificate (EVC) as the
means to provide reliable server to user authentication. The user’s actions
to be taken are: read the certificate image displayed in the URL address
bar(action 1), and read the URL string displayed in the URL address
bar (action 2). The user decisions to be made are: determine whether
the current website belongs to Ebay by using the information displayed
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by the certificate image (decision 1), and determine whether the current
website belongs to Ebay by interpreting the URL string (decision 2).
It appears that both the server to user authentication system and the user
action and decision model are the same as the ones in the case study
one, so we will not analyse them again here. In fact, any EVC based
user authentication shares the following vulnerabilities: USV-A2 and
USV–D1. The associated risk level for USV-A2 is high (4) and for USV-D1
is very high (5). The server to user authentication by reading the URL
string shares the following vulnerabilities: USV-A1, USV-A3, USV-D3,
and USV-D4. The associated risk level for all four vulnerabilities is very
high (5).
Security Policy Analysis
The authentication credentials in set A and C face DUT. Ebay has no par-
ticular security policies for authentication credentials apart from telling its
users they should choose a strong password and keep the authentication
credentials secret.
The authentication credential set A requires the user to remember a user
name and a password. The user name is an alphanumeric string which is
assigned by users. The password must be at least 6 characters long and is
a combination of at least two of the following: upper-case or lower case
letters (A-Z or a-z), numbers (0-9) and special characters. By checking
Table 4.3, the choice of such authentication credentials could lead to USV-
P2 and USV-P3. Both authentication credentials are assigned by users,
hence reuse of the authentication credentials can not be prevented. Given
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users have over 20 active online accounts (using a password as one of the
user authentication credentials) on average, most users would not have
the ability to remember distinct passwords for each account. It is very
likely some of them will write passwords down, store them externally,
or even reuse them. As a result the security policy requirement to keep
the authentication credentials secret would be broken. However, the risk
level associated with these two vulnerabilities are low (2), because first
these vulnerabilities may not lead to the compromise of the whole set of
authentication credentials, secondly it is still difficult to find out where
users have reused the authentication credentials, and thirdly the value of
Pu and Pi are medium at most.
The composition of set C is very similar to the set C in case study one,
they are based on information describing who users are. As with set
C in case study one, it also has vulnerabilities USV-P3 and USV-P4.
The associated risk level is very high for insiders and high for normal
(external) attackers.
The access to an email account in set B faces DTPT. Attacks realising
only this threat could not compromise the whole set of authentication
credentials in Set A. This type of threat hasn’t yet been discussed. Since
the email account is managed by a third party chosen by a user, the
security of the email account itself and the authentication credentials to
access that email account are uncertain to Ebay, and Ebay has no control
over users’ choice of email account providers or the security of the email
account provided. The compromise of the email account can lead to
the compromise of set B. As a result, the USV-P7 exists. Pu and Pi are
difficult to determine, because of the uncertainty introduced by the user’s
choice. With common sense, most people use a reasonably protected
email account provider such as google, hotmail, yahoo, etc, so Pu is low
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(users who use less secure email providers are minority). However, if for
users who do use less secure email providers, then they are likely to be
attacked. So Pi should at least be medium. By checking Table 4.4, the risk
level for USV-P7 is very low(1).
4.8 Discussion
In this chapter, a threat modelling method to identify user related vul-
nerabilities within an authentication system is described. This method is
asset (authentication credentials) centric, and has four steps. In the system
design stage, designers can follow the steps and methods described to
analyse how attackers could make users to behave in ways that could
lead to the compromise of authentication credentials. The method is also
designed to make the execution as systematic as possible. For example,
the various tables can provide a consistent framework and procedure for
execution. The usefulness of this method is also demonstrated by the two
case studies.
One of the difficulties of using this method is how to assign the appro-
priate value to the properties of authentication credentials, or Pu and
Pi etc. This needs to be determined based on the characteristics of the
user group. If such knowledge is not directly available, then one has to
make assumptions. If in doubt then the analyst should assume worst
case scenario. The experience of security professionals could also make
this judgement easier, but this would only be possible if the method is
applied to study more authentication systems.
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Table 4.8: Threats for Set A
SIT DUT DTPT
user id
√ √
password
√ √
memorable word
√ √
Table 4.9: Threats for Set B
SIT DUT DTPT
first name
√ √
last name
√ √
birthdate
√ √
sort code
√ √
account number
√ √
Table 4.10: Threats for Set C
SIT DUT DTPT
user id
√ √
first name
√ √
last name
√ √
birthdate
√ √
129
Chapter 4 Threat Modelling
Table
4.11:A
uthentication
C
redentialProperties
for
Set
A
Factors
A
ssignm
ent
D
irectness
M
em
orability
C
C
KNO
POS
ACC
ARE
User
System
Third Party
direct
indirect
High
Medium
Low
Closed
Open
user
id
√
√
√
√
√
passw
ord
√
√
√
√
√
130
4.8 Discussion
Ta
bl
e
4.
12
:A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n
C
re
de
nt
ia
lP
ro
pe
rt
ie
s
fo
r
Se
t
B
Fa
ct
or
s
A
ss
ig
nm
en
t
D
ir
ec
tn
es
s
M
em
or
ab
ili
ty
C
C
KNO
POS
ACC
ARE
User
System
ThirdParty
direct
indirect
High
Medium
Low
Closed
Open
em
ai
la
dd
re
ss
√
√
√
√
√
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
em
ai
la
cc
ou
nt
√
√
–
–
–
–
–
√
131
Chapter 4 Threat Modelling
Table
4.13:A
uthentication
C
redentialProperties
for
Set
C
Factors
A
ssignm
ent
D
irectness
M
em
orability
C
C
KNO
POS
ACC
ARE
User
System
Third Party
direct
indirect
High
Medium
Low
Closed
Open
user
id
√
√
√
√
√
answ
ers
to
security
question
√
–
–
–
√
–
–
–
√
post
code
√
–
–
–
√
–
–
–
√
telephone
num
ber
√
–
–
–
√
–
–
–
√
date
of
birth
√
–
–
–
√
–
–
–
√
132
4.8 Discussion
Table 4.14: Threats for Set A
SIT DUT DTPT
user id
√ √
password
√ √
Table 4.15: Threats for Set B
SIT DUT DTPT
email address
√ √
access to the email account
√ √
Table 4.16: Threats for Set C
SIT DUT DTPT
user id
√ √
answers to security question
√ √
post code
√ √
telephone number
√ √
date of birth
√ √
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Chapter 5
User Behaviours Based Phishing
Website Detection
This chapter presents the design, implementation and evaluation of the
user-behaviour based phishing detection system (UBPD), a software pack-
age designed to help users avoid releasing their credentials inappropri-
ately.
5.1 Overview
UBPD alerts users only when they are about to submit credential inform-
ation to a phishing website (i.e. when other existing countermeasures
have failed), and protects users as the last line of defence. Its detection al-
gorithm is independent of the manifestation of phishing attacks, e.g., how
phishing attacks are implemented and deception method used. Hence,
its detection is resilient against evasion techniques, and it has significant
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potential to detect sophisticated phishing websites that other techniques
find hard to deal with. In contrast to existing detection techniques based
only on the incoming data (from attackers to user victims), this technique
is also much simpler, and needs to deal with much less low level technical
detail.
Note: In this chapter we use ‘interact’, ‘interaction’ and ‘user-webpage
interaction’ to refer to the user supplying data to a webpage.
5.2 Detection Principle
The work described in the previous chapter aims to discover the threats
arising at authentication interfaces. Yet despite our best efforts to re-
duce the risks associated with interfaces, we have to accept that false
perceptions will be created and render users exploitable. Thus we need
to address these aspects too.
From a detection system’s perspective, phishing attacks can be described
by the simple model shown in Figure 5.1 (this model is abstracted from
the attack incidents collected and phishing attack techniques the author is
aware of). A phishing attack has two parts. In the first part attackers try
to send user victims into the phishing attack black box by approaching
them via a chosen communication channel. (The most frequently used
communication channel is email.) A phishing attack is a black box because
prior to the launch of the attack, victims and detection systems have no
knowledge of the strategy of the attack, what techniques will be used, and
how phishing email and websites are implemented. After going through
136
5.2 Detection Principle
Figure 5.1: Existing Phishing Attack Detection Model
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this black box, in the second part of this model there are two possible
outcomes for a user: a false perception has successfully engineered and
suggested actions taken, or a false perception has not been engineered
and suggested actions have not been taken.
Existing detection methods discussed in Chapter 2 try to understand all
possible internal mechanisms of this black box (how attackers deceive
victims to disclose sensitive information, e.g, the implementation of
phishing attacks, characteristics of phishing email and phishing websites,
and deception methods used), and then in turn recognise manifestations
of such attacks among many other legitimate user-system interactions.
This approach to detection is reactive and high detection accuracy can be
very difficult to achieve, because:
• It is very hard to lower the false positive rate while keeping the
detection rate high. It may be very hard to distinguish phishing
websites and legitimate websites by examining their contents from
a technical point of view. A phishing website itself can be imple-
mented in the same way as a legitimate website.
• Attackers have the advantage in evading existing detection by chan-
ging and inventing new mechanisms in the black box, i.e. varying
the deception method as well as the implementation of the phishing
websites.
To detect phishing websites effectively and efficiently, a fundamental
change to the existing detection approach should be considered. Accord-
ing to the model described in chapter 3, the last step before a phishing
attack succeeds is the execution of the actions (releasing of sensitive in-
formation) suggested by attackers. Hence UBPD aims to detect when a
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user is about to release his/her credentials to attackers. It takes the view
that the problem is really the release of credentials to inappropriate places;
if there are no unfortunate releases. there is no problem. Furthermore,
since the release of credentials is at the core of many phishing attacks,
the approach should find wide application. Hence, the detection is in-
dependent of attacking techniques. The advantage is that an attacker’s
strategy can no longer affect the detection, and it could potentially achieve
a very low false positive rate while keeping the detection rate high as
well. Another advantage is that UBPD’s detection is on demand, it will
only actively interrupt users when the user is about to carry out counter-
productive actions. This leads to fewer interruptions for a user and better
usability as result of this.
5.2.1 What User Actions Should UBPD Detect?
Phishing websites are illegal and they work by impersonating legitimate
websites. To reduce the chances of being discovered, attackers would only
host phishing websites when an attack is launched. Phishing websites
are also constantly being monitored, and once discovered they are taken
down. As a result, phishing websites have a very short life time. On
average a phishing website lasts 62 hours [66]. This suggests that users
are extremely unlikely to visit a phishing website prior to the point of
being attacked. So the first action UBPD examines is whether a user is
visiting a new website or not. However, visiting a new website can not be
used in isolation to decide whether a user is being attacked, and so UBPD
further monitors users’ actions when they are visiting a new website.
Secondly, regardless of methods used, as described in chapter 3 phishing
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attacks always generate an erroneous user perception. In successful
web based phishing attacks, victims have believed they are interacting
with websites which belong to legitimate and reputable organisations or
individuals. Thus the crucial mismatch that phishers create is one of real
versus apparent identity.
In UBPD mismatch detection is informed by comparisons of current and
previous behaviours. The authentication credentials, which phishers try
to elicit, ought to be shared only between users and legitimate organ-
isations. Such (authentication credential, legitimate website) pairs are
viewed as the user’s binding relationships. In legitimate web authentication
interactions, the authentication credentials are sent to the website they
have been bound to. In a phishing attack the mismatches cause the user
to unintentionally break binding relationships by sending credentials to a
phishing website. When a user is visiting a new website and also tries to
submit the authentication credentials he or she has already shared with
a legitimate website, UBPD decides that the user is currently visiting a
phishing website.
So in summary, a phishing website can be detected when both of the
following two conditions are met:
1. the current website has rarely or never been visited before by the
user;
2. the sensitive data, which the user is about to submit, is bound to a
website other than the current one.
The first condition is relatively simple to check, the difficulty lies in how
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Figure 5.2: Detection Process Work Flow
to accurately predict whether the second condition will be met before any
data is transmitted to a remote server. The following sections describe
how UBPD is designed to achieve this.
5.3 System Design
This section describes the design of the UBPD and provides an overview
of how information flows through the system, how user behaviour related
information is created and maintained, how the information is used to
determine the risks of the current interaction, how phishing sites are
detected, and how the security of the system is maintained.
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5.3.1 Overview Of The Detection Work Flow:
UBPD has three components:
• The user profile contains data to describe the user’s binding rela-
tionships and the user’s personal white list (this is a list of sites
that the user has visited frequently). This profile is constructed
once UBPD is installed, so that UBPD can detect phishing websites
immediately.
• The monitor listens to actions by the user, collects the data the user
intends to submit and the identity of the destination websites, and
activates the detection engine.
• The detection engine uses the data provided by the monitor to detect
phishing websites and update the user profile when necessary.
UBPD has two working modes: training mode and detection mode. In
training mode, UBPD runs in the background, and focuses on learning
newly created binding relationships or updating the existing binding
relationships. When in detection mode, UBPD checks whether any of the
user’s binding relationships would be violated if the user-submitted data
is sent to the current website. The mode in which UBPD runs is decided
by checking whether the webpage belongs to a website
1. whose top level domain1 is in the user’s personal white list; or
1Suppose the URL of a webpage is “domain2.domain1.com/files/page1.htm”, the top level
domain is “domain1.com”
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2. with which the user has shared authentication credentials.
There could be cases where a website is not in user’s white list but with
which the user has shared authentication credentials. Hence, UPBD
checks both cases to decide the running mode. If either is true the system
will operate in training mode, otherwise, it will operate in detection
mode. Potential phishing webpages will always cause UBPD to run in
the detection mode, since they satisfy neither condition. The legitimate
websites with which users have binding relationships always cause UBPD
to run in the training mode. UBPD will be running under detection mode
if a user is visiting a new website.
The detection work flow is shown in Figure 5.2. Once a user opens a
new webpage, the monitor decides in which mode UBPD should run.
Then, according to the working mode the monitor chooses an appropriate
method to collect the data the user has submitted to the current webpage,
and sends it to the detection engine once the user initiates data submission.
The details of the data collection methods are discussed in section 5.4.
When running in detection mode if the binding relationships are found
to be violated, the data the user submitted will not be sent and a warning
dialogue will be presented. For the remaining cases, UBPD will allow
data submission.
5.3.2 Creation Of The User Profile:
The user profile contains a personal white list and the user’s binding
relationships. The personal white list contains a list of top level domains
of websites. The binding relationships are represented as a collection of
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Figure 5.3: User Profile Creation –1
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Figure 5.4: User Profile Creation –2
145
Chapter 5 User Behaviours Based Phishing Website Detection
paired records, i.e., 〈aTopLevelDomain, aSecretDataItem〉.
Creation of a user profile is a mandatory step of UBPD’s installation
procedure. This is security action users must take to ensure the detection
accuracy. Suggested by the threat modelling method described in chapter
4, if user security action is not enforced by the design, a vulnerability will
be created.
Having successfully installed, UBPD will compose a personal white list
when the web browser is restarted for the first time. This white list is
mainly used to monitor an occurrence of the first user action mentioned
in section 5.2.1. It is worth emphasizing that this white list is not used
to decide whether the current website is legitimate or not. The top level
domain names of the websites, which the user has visited more than
three times (configurable) according to the user’s browsing history, will
be added to the white list. In addition the top level domain names of the
most visited 500 (configurable) websites in the user’s country are also
added. This information is obtained from Alexa, a company specialising
in providing internet traffic ranking information. By default, this white
list is also automatically updated weekly.
The addition of the most visited 500 websites improves system operating
efficiency (reducing the number of times the system needs to run in
detection mode and the number of occasions where users need to interact
with the warning dialog). As already discussed in Chapter 4, if a security
action happens frequently, then this could lead to unacceptable mental
load on users. As a result users may users pay less attention to it and
could make wrong decisions. So it is very important to reduce the number
of times users receive the warning message. These 500 websites could
be viewed as a reflection of mass users’ online browsing behaviours, and
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they are clearly not phishing websites. Given these websites’ popularity,
if a user did not visit and have an account with them already, the user is
likely to do so in future. Without this addition these websites will make
UBPD run under detection mode when a user is visiting these websites
for the first time. With this addition, UBPD would run in training mode in
these circumstances. The computation required in training mode is much
less intense than in detection mode. Moreover, in detection mode if a user
reuses existing authentication credentials to set up an account with these
websites during the user’s first visit, UBPD will issue a phishing website
warning. Although such reuse may not be appropriate, the phishing
website warning is wrong. However, with the addition to the white list
UBPD would be run in the training mode, and this type of false warning
will never occur. In fact, the described situation, which could potentially
trigger false phishing websites warnings, is very rare, nevertheless it is
still good to prevent such false warnings.
Having constructed the initial personal white list, UBPD then presents
users with a dialogue which asks for the websites with which users have
accounts (shown in Figure 5.3). In the next step UBPD automatically takes
users to those websites, and asks users to fill in the authentication forms
on those websites one by one. In addition, UBPD also dynamically modi-
fies each authentication webpage, so that all the buttons on the webpage
will be replaced with the ‘Train(UBPD)’ button. Once a user clicks on it,
UBPD creates new binding relationship records in the user profile, and
then asks whether the user wants to carry on the authentication process
(in case it is a multiple step authentication) or go to the next website. A
screen shot is shown in Figure 5.4.
It is estimated that on average users have over 20 active web accounts
[28]. It would be unrealistic to expect all users to obey instructions and
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train UBPD with all their active binding relationships. However, it is
reasonable to expect users to train UBPD with their most valuable binding
relationships (such as their online accounts with financial organisations).
As long as they can do that, their most valuable authentication credentials
are protected by UBPD.
5.3.3 Update Of The User Profile:
There are two ways a user profile can be updated with unknown binding
relationships. One is initiated by a user and proceeds by the user manually
typing in the binding relationships through the provided user interface,
and the other is an automatic method which is only active when UBPD is
running in the training mode. The former is straightforward, the latter
will be described in more detail here.
This automatic method tries to detect whether a user is authenticating
herself to a server, and if so whether the current binding relationship
is known to UBPD or not. If not, the current binding relationships
will be added to the user’s profile. To detect an authentication session
regardless of the nature of the websites involved can be very difficult,
as phishing websites could be deliberately implemented to disrupt such
detection. Fortunately, with the current design, and especially the help
of the personal white list, this authentication session detection method
needs only to consider legitimate websites (this method is only active
during training mode). It is safe to assume those legitimate websites
would not choose to implement their user authentication webpage by
using non-standard methods.
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The authentication session is detected by analysing the HTML source
code, such as the annotation, label, use of certain tags (such as 〈form〉)
and type of the HTML elements. If the user is using a web authentication
form, and the user profile contains no binding relationships with the
current website, then UBPD prompts a window to ask the user to update
the user profile. If there is an existing binding relationship for the current
website, then UBPD will replace the authentication credentials in the
binding relationships with the latest values the user submits. If users
have entered the authentication credentials wrongly, those credentials will
still be stored, but those wrong values will be corrected when users relog
in with the correct authentication credentials. In future, the detection of
web authentication page usage should be much simpler and more accurate
once web authentication interfaces [40, 81, 83] are standardised.
5.3.4 Phishing Score Calculation:
As stated earlier, UBPD would detect only violations of users’ binding
relationships when UBPD is running in detection mode (e.g. the first
user action – visiting a new website, occurs). The violation of binding
relationships and the impersonating target of a phishing attack is decided
by calculating phishing scores.
The calculation is a two step process. In the first step, for each legitimate
website with which the user has shared authentication credentials, a
temporary phishing score is calculated. Each temporary phishing score
is the fraction of the authentication credentials associated with a legitim-
ate website that also appear in the data to be submitted to the current
webpage. Its value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0.
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Figure 5.5: An Example of How the Phishing Score Is Calculated
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In the second step those temporary phishing scores are sorted into des-
cending order. The current webpage’s phishing score is the highest score
calculated. The phishing score is a measure of how much authentication
credentials have been exposed to potential attackers. Hence, the higher
the phishing score, the more likely the user’s account will be comprom-
ised. The legitimate website with the highest temporary phishing score is
considered to be the impersonated target of the phishing website. If more
than one legitimate website has yielded the highest phishing score (due
to the reuse of authentication credentials), they will all be considered
as targets. Although it may not be the attacker’s intent, the data they
get if an attack succeeds can certainly be used to compromise the user’s
accounts with those legitimate websites. Figure 5.5 illustrates how a
phishing score is calculated in UBPD.
Given the phishing score calculation method, clever attackers may ask vic-
tims to submit their credential information through a series of webpages,
with each phishing webpage asking only for a small part of data stored
in the user profile. To handle this fragmentation attack UBPD has a
threshold value and cache mechanism. The system maintains a history
of which shared credentials have been released and so when a credential
is about to be released an accumulated score can be calculated. Once
the phishing score is above the threshold the current webpage will be
considered as a phishing webpage. The system’s default threshold is 0.6.
Why UBPD chooses 0.6 is discussed in section 5.5. If the current phishing
score is not zero, UBPD also remembers which data has been sent to the
current website and will consider it in the next interaction if there is one.
Accordingly many fragmentation attacks can be detected.
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5.3.5 Reuse:
It is very common for a user to share the same authentication credentials
(user names, passwords, etc) with different websites. So when a user
submits the shared authentication credentials to one legitimate website,
it could be considered as violation of binding relationship between the
authentication credentials and other legitimate websites. The two running
modes and the user’s personal white list are designed to prevent such
false warnings caused by reuse without compromising detection accuracy.
A false warning would increase the user’s work load, and potentially
could lead to USV–D3 vulnerabilities described in Section section 4.5.1.
UBPD detects the violation of binding relationships only when the user
is interacting with websites that are neither in the user’s white lists nor
which the user has account with. So long as legitimate websites for which
users have used the same authentication credentials are all contained
in the user profile, there will be no false phishing warnings generated
due to the reuse. The method that UBPD uses to create the user profile
ensures such legitimate websites are most likely to be included, as those
websites are either within the user’s browsing history or are popular
websites in the user’s region. Our preliminary false positive evaluation
has supported this.
5.3.6 Warning Dialogue:
The warning dialog design is guided by the findings in the user phishing
interaction model described in Chapter 3, i.e. to form accurate mental
model and make correct decision users need accurate and easy to under-
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stand messages from the user interface. Figure 5.6 is a warning dialog
example. To make the information easy to understand, the dialogue tells
users that the current website, to which they are submitting credentials,
is not one of the legitimate websites associated with those authentication
credentials. To help users understand the detection result and make a
correct decision, UBPD identifies up to five areas of differences between
the legitimate website and the possible phishing website: the domain
name, the domain registrant, the domain registration time, name servers,
and IP addresses. Users don’t need to understand those terms. They
only need be able to recognise the difference between values of the five
attributes of the legitimate website and the phishing website.
If the warning dialog is raised due to the reuse of the authentication
credentials, then users need to make a decision to train UBPD by clicking
the train UBPD button. To make sure users make conscious decisions
and this button is disabled by default initially. It can be enabled only by
double clicking it. A confirmation dialog, which asks users to specify the
account ,whose authentication credentials are reused, is then shown to
users. Training will be done only if the correct account is specified.
5.3.7 Website Equivalence:
To discover whether the user is about to submit the authentication cre-
dentials to entities with which they have not been bound, UBPD needs
to be able to accurately decide whether a given website is equivalent to
the website recorded in the user’s binding relationships. It is much more
complicated than just literally comparing two URLs or IP addresses of
two websites, because:
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• big organisations often have web sites under different domain
names, and users can access their account from any of these do-
mains;
• the IP address of a website can be different each time if dynamic IP
addressing is used;
• it is hard to avoid ‘pharming’ attacks, in which the phishing site’s
URL is identical to a legitimate one.
UBPD first compares the two websites’ domain names and IP addresses.
When the two domain names and two IP addresses are equal the web
sites are assumed to be identical. Otherwise, the system interrogates
the WHOIS2 database and uses the information returned to determine
equivalence. When analysing two different IP addresses our system
compares the netnames, name servers, and the countries where each IP
address is registered. If they are all identical then the two websites are
deemed to be identical. This method can also detect pharming attacks,
in which both fraudulent and legitimate websites have the same domain
name but are hosted on different IP addresses.
This method is not perfect. A more elegant and complete solution would
be a mechanism where servers provide security relevant metadata (in-
cluding the outsourcing information) to the web browser via a standard
protocol as suggested by Behera and Agarwal [8]. However, unless it
becomes a standard we have to rely on WHOIS. The Extended Validation
Certificate [29] can provide information to decide whether two websites
2WHOIS is a TCP-based query/response protocol which is widely used for querying a
database in order to determine the owner of a domain name, an IP address. RFC 3912
describes the protocol in detail.
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belong to the same party, but the problem is the high cost, high entry level
and complexity of obtaining such certificates. Many small and medium
businesses will not be able to own them; unless this situation changes
they cannot be used to decide website equivalence in general.
5.3.8 User Privacy:
Since a user profile contains confidential user information, it is important
that it is secure enough and it does not add new security risks. We use
a one-way secure hash function to hash the confidential data before it
is stored on the hard disk. When the system needs to determine the
equivalence between the data, the system just needs to compare the hash
values.
However, because the domain name of the website is not hashed, if
the profile is obtained by attackers they would be able to find out with
which websites users have accounts and where users have reused their
authentication credentials. This information is helpful for attackers; for
example, it can be used to launch context aware phishing attacks against
the users. To prevent this, when the system is installed it will randomly
generate a secret key, and this key will be used to encrypt and decrypt
the domain names.
5.3.9 Implementation:
UBPD is implemented as a Firefox add-on for Firefox 2.x. Most of the
detection is implemented using JavaScript. The hash function we use is
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SHA-1[52] and the encryption method we use is Twofish[1]. The hash
function and encryption methods can be changed, we choose to use them
mainly because there are open source implementations available. UBPD
can easily change to other types of hash and encryption methods when
required. The user interface of the system is implemented by using XUL,
a technology developed by Mozilla [32]. Although only implemented
on Firefox, we are not aware of any impediment to it being ported
to other browsers, such as Internet Explorer and Opera. After all, all
technology (e.g. JavaScript, algorithms) used in UBPD can be reused on
other browsers.
5.4 Evasion And Countermeasures
Once deployed, it is inevitable that attackers would seek vulnerabilities in
UBPD that they can use to evade the detection. To prevent such evasions,
UBPD is designed with serious consideration of possible evasion tech-
niques. Two types of attack evasion techniques have been considered:
1. Evading detection by manipulating the user submitted data, based
on which UBPD checks the violation of the binding relationships.
UBPD decides whether a binding relationship is violated by com-
paring the user submitted data with the authentication credentials
that are already shared with legitimate websites. If attackers could
somehow make UBPD see different values or a small portion of
what a user actually submits, then UBPD will not be able to make
correct detection decision.
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2. Evading detection by disrupting the detection process. Unlike other
phishing websites detection tools, UBPD’s detection is not activated
until a user submits data to a strange website and its detection
warning is raised only shortly before the sensitive data is about
to be sent to an attacker. As a result, if attackers manage to delay
UBPD’s action then their attacks could succeed before users’ get
warnings.
Below we describe how UBPD is designed to be resilient to these type of
evasion techniques.
5.4.1 Manipulating User Submitted Data
The data a user submits to a webpage can be easily retrieved by accessing
the DOM interface using client script language, such as JavaScript. At-
tackers could manipulate the user submitted data before the monitor of
UBPD retrieves it.
Disabling the use of any client side script language can solve this problem.
However, it does impact users’ experience with the Internet. A large
number of rich content websites use JavaScripts for client side features.
Moreover, many vital business functions provided by today’s websites
are implemented using such languages; disabling them also disables the
functions provided by those websites. As a result, such disabling is not
a workable solution. Instead, the monitor of UBPD performs like a key
logger. It listens to keyboard and mouse events, and it remembers the
data a user has typed into each input field in a webpage. In this way, the
data a user submits to a webpage is seen by UBPD first and the webpage
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has no chance to manipulate any user submitted data. In general, such
key logging is very efficient to run, since it is activated only in detection
mode. In training mode, websites that users are visiting are legitimate and
the monitor still uses the DOM interface to retrieve the user submitted
data, as in those cases client scripts manipulation is not an issue (any
website can embed a piece of JavaScript to retrieve user entered data).
5.4.2 Insertion And Fragmentation
UBPD would work perfectly if phishing attacks request the whole set of
authentication credentials that a user has shared with the impersonated
legitimate website in one phishing webpage. However, attackers may try
to vary the amount of sensitive credentials they request in one phishing
webpage to disrupt the detection. Below are two possible methods they
might use.
Insertion: In this phishing attack, there is only one phishing webpage.
The information that the phishing webpage asks for includes not only
the authentication credentials, but also includes other data that are not
shared between the user and the impersonated website.
Fragmentation: In this phishing attack, there are multiple phishing
webpages. On each phishing webpage users will be asked for only a
small part of the authentication credentials shared with the impersonated
legitimate website.
The current phishing score calculation method (described in section 5.3.4)
has been designed to be resilient against insertion attacks. The noise of
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the non-related data should not affect the final phishing score.
The problem now is how to avoid fragmentation attacks, and the threshold
value is introduced to prevent evasion by fragmentation attacks. Once
the phishing score is above the threshold the current webpage will be
considered as a phishing webpage. The system’s default threshold is
0.6. Whenever a webpage is encountered whose phishing score is not
zero, UBPD remembers the sensitive information has been revealed to
the website (websites are recognised by their top level domains). In
subsequent interactions with this website, the phishing score calculation
will also consider the authentication credentials that have been revealed
previously. Such phishing score caching will exist only for 24 hours.
Accordingly many fragmentation attacks can be detected as well.
5.4.3 Activation Of The Detection Engine
Normally webpages process and forward user submitted data using
built-in functions, such as the one provided by the standard web form.
(Many legitimate websites use this function to submit the data.) The
detection engine is triggered and data submission is suspended when the
monitor discovers the use of such functions. This is achieved by listening
for ‘DOMActivate’ [42] events. These events are fired by the browser
when such built-in functions have been used. This is the mechanism the
monitor uses to activate the detection engine when the system is running
in training mode.
However, there are other ways user submitted data could be transmitted
to a remote server. Phishers can use client side scripts to implement
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these built in functions. For example, by using JavaScript they can
access the DOM interface to retrieve the data users enter and use AJAX
(Asynchronous JavaScript And XML) techniques to send the data to the
server before a user clicks the submit button. If UBPD relied only on
listening for ‘DOMActivate’ events to start the detection decision making,
then sensitive user data could have already been sent to attackers. To
prevent this evasion, UBPD must monitor the client script function calls
when it is running in detection mode. The function calls that should
be monitored are ‘open()’ and ‘send()’ from the ‘xmlhttprequest’ API [82].
These are the only two functions that client scripts can use to send data to
the server. Once the monitor discovers such function calls, the function is
suspended and the detection engine is triggered. Regardless of the data
the client scripts would like to send, the detection engine always works
on all the data the user has entered to the current webpage. The function
call is only resumed if the detection engine thinks the current website is
legitimate. In the worst case, attackers would still be able to obtain a part
of users’ authentication credentials, but they will not be able to gain the
full set of user authentication credentials (otherwise the phishing score
will be higher than the threshold and an alert will be generated).
5.4.4 Denial Of Service Attack
Since the detection engine would be triggered once the ‘xmlhttprequest’
API has been called, the attackers can issue this function call continuously
to freeze the browser. To prevent this, the monitor can keep a record of
whether there is user input since the last time the detection engine was
activated for the same webpage. If there is then the detection engine will
be activated, otherwise, not.
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UBPD decides whether two websites belong to the same entity by ana-
lysing the information provided by the WHOIS database. The current
implementation uses only the WHOIS database, freely available on the
Internet. The attackers could apply Denial of Service attacks on the
WHOIS database so that the system would hang. (This is a clear external
dependency of our tool.)
5.5 Evaluation
Two experiments have been carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of
UBPD in terms of the two following rates:
• False negative (Fn) : The probability the system fails to recognise a
phishing attack.
• False positive (Fp) : The probability the system recognises a legit-
imate website as a phishing website.
How these two rates are calculated are shown below:
Fn =
the number of phishing websites that are not detected
total number of websites that are used in the test
Fp =
the number of legitimate websites that are identified as phishing websites
total number of websites that are used in the test
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of User Profile
Alice Bob Carol Dave
Reuse No No Yes Yes
Uniqueness Strong Weak Strong Weak
The lower the two rates, the more technically effective is UBPD’s detec-
tion.
In addition I also search for a useful default threshold value for generating
phishing alert (mentioned in section 5.3.4). To focus on evaluating the
detection effectiveness, for both experiments UBPD was modified to not
present the warning dialogue. Instead it records the phishing score results
as well as the URLs for later analysis.
5.5.1 False Negative Rate
From PhishTank [74] and Millersmiles [64] 463 phishing webpages repor-
ted between 2nd November 2007 and 16th November 2007 were collected.
These phishing websites impersonated Ebay, Paypal, and Natwest bank.
I created four user profiles, which describe four artificial users’ binding
relationships with the three targeted websites. The four user profiles have
different characteristics as shown in Table 5.1. ‘Reuse’ indicates maximum
possible reuse of authentication credentials. In this case the user would
have same user name and password for Ebay and Paypal. ‘Uniqueness’
indicates whether the user would use the exact data they shared with a
legitimate website at other places. For example if Bob chooses his email
address as his password then the uniqueness is weak, because Bob is
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Table 5.2: Phishing Websites Characteristics
Ebay Paypal Natwest
AC 211 176 39
AC+PI 22 5 6
PI 4 0 0
Total 237 181 45
very likely to tell other websites his email address. If Bob uses some
random string as his password, then the uniqueness is strong, because
this random string is unlikely to be used with any other websites. Using
different user profiles in this experiment allow us to see whether UBPD’s
detection will be affected by such user behaviours.
The artificial authentication credentials were submitted to each of the
phishing webpages. Regardless of the characteristics of the user profile,
the detection result is the same for all four users: 459 pages had a phishing
score of 1, and 4 had a phishing score of 0. Thus only four pages evaded
detection – Fn is 0.0086.
Detailed analysis confirms that the detection result is determined mainly
by the information requested by the phishing webpage. Table 5.2 shows
the classification of the phishing webpages based on the type of inform-
ation they requested. 92% of the collected phishing webpages asked
only for authentication credentials and 7.14% of the collected phishing
webpages asked both for personal and authentication credentials.
The four phishing web pages UBPD failed to detect asked only for per-
sonal information such as full name, address, telephone number and
mother’s maiden name. In fact, they can not be detected by UBPD no
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matter what the threshold value is. However, this is only a minor is-
sue. It is highly suspicious and impractical for phishing attacks to ask
for such personal information without asking users to log into their ac-
counts by providing authentication credentials first. In reality phishing
websites would normally first present the user with a login webpage
before directing the user to the webpage asking for the personal inform-
ation. In fact, none of the four phishing webpages that UBPD failed to
detect are the landing page of the phishing attacks, and all of them are
phishing webpages that users would come across after giving up their
authentication credentials in previous interaction steps.
5.5.2 False Positive Rate
Five volunteers were provided with the information needed to install
UBPD on their machine. They were not explicitly asked to train UBPD
with all their binding relationships, because I wanted to see how users
would train UBPD and what the false positives would be in reality if the
user had not properly trained it. At the end of one week, the result logs
were collected from their machines.
The volunteers were three male and two female science students. They all
used Firefox as their main web browser. They were all regular Internet
users (on average over three hours per day). As a result the UBPD was
activated a large number of times and the interactions that occurred
during the experiments covered a wide range of types of interaction.
Another reason we chose those volunteers is because they are the most
unlikely user group to fall victims to phishing attacks [46], because of
their technical knowledge and awareness of phishing attacks. Hence,
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we can safely assume they have not fallen victims to phishing attacks
during the time of study. In total the volunteers interacted with 76 distinct
websites, submitted data to those websites 2107 times, and UBPD ran
in detection mode only 81 times. In fact all the websites volunteers
visited were legitimate. On 59 occasions the phishing score was 0, on five
interactions gave a score of 0.25, on 13 occasions the score was 0.5, and
the score was 1 on three occasions.
The phishing score was 1 when users interacted with three legitimate
websites (the registration webpages of videojug.com and surveys.com,
and the authentication webpage of a web forum). The volunteers were
then asked what data they supplied to those webpages. It seems that
the reuse of authentication credentials on creating new accounts is the
reason. In this experiment, the warning dialog is not presented, as we
did not aim to test usability. The user must make a decision to train
UBPD to remember these new binding relationships, acknowledging that
such reuse is not ideal. To avoid the user’s confusion about what is the
right choice when the warning dialog is presented, the dialog always
reminds the user of the legitimate websites UBPD is aware of, and tells
the user that if the user is sure the current website is legitimate, and
the website is not remembered by UBPD, then they need to update their
binding relationships (see the Figure 5.6 in section 5.3.6). This requires no
technical knowledge and should be quite easy to understand. There are
only two choices provided by the dialog: update the profile and submit
the data; or do not send the user submitted data and close the phishing
webpage. There is no third choice provided by the dialog, in this way we
force the user to make the security decision and they can not just ignore
the warnings given by the system.
Many websites force users to supply an email address as the user name.
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As a result, the user’s email address is kept in the user profile as part of
user’s authentication credentials. This email address almost inevitably
will be given out to other websites, which are not contained in the user
profile, for various reasons such as contact method, activate the newly
registered account, etc. Thus even when the user does not intend to give
out their credentials, the email address nevertheless is shared and UBPD
simply confirmed that by calculating the phishing score of 0.5 (which
means half of the data the user has shared with a legitimate website was
given away to a website that was not in user’s profile) on 13 occasions.
For one volunteer five interactions gave a phishing score of 0.25. The user
had an account at a major bank, the authentication credentials for which
compromised four data items. One of these was the family name. For
other sites not included in the user’s profile asking for this information
caused our system to identify the sharing of the data.
Based on the figures from both experiments I decided to set the default
threshold value to 0.6. First, it can successfully detect phishing webpages
asking for more than half of the credentials the user has shared with
a legitimate website (99.14% of the phishing websites in Experiment
One can be detected). It also generated few false positives. The false
positive rate of the system is 0.0014 (obtained by dividing the number of
false positives generated with the total number of times the UBPD was
activated).
The result of the false positive evaluation shows UBPD has a small
false positive rate, and it also shows that the reuse of the authentication
credentials and partial training are the main cause of the false positives.
167
Chapter 5 User Behaviours Based Phishing Website Detection
5.6 Discussion
5.6.1 Why UBPD Is Useful
Besides its high detection accuracy, UBPD is useful also because it comple-
ments existing detection systems. First UBPD detects phishing websites
based on users’ behaviours, not the incoming data that attackers can ma-
nipulate freely. Violation of the binding relationships cannot be changed
no matter what techniques phishers choose to use. As the evaluation
proves, UBPD is able to consistently detect phishing webpages regardless
of how they are implemented as long as they ask for authentication cre-
dentials. In contrast detection systems based on incoming data may find it
difficult to deal with novel and sophisticated spoofing techniques. UBPD
analyses the identity of websites using both IP addresses and domain
names, it can detect pharming attacks, which are undetectable by many
existing systems. Being independent of the incoming data means low
cost in maintenance, the system does not need updating when attackers
vary their techniques, and so we have far fewer evasion techniques to
deal with.
Some systems have tried to stop phishing attacks from reaching the users
(phishing site take down, botnet take down, phishing email filter, etc.),
some have tried to detect phishing webpages as soon as users arrive at
a new web page (Phishing URL blacklist, netcraft toolbar, spoofguard,
CARTINA, etc), and some have tried to provide useful information or
indicators to help users to detect phishing websites. However, there are no
other systems that work at the stage when phishing webpages have some-
how penetrated through and users have started to give out information
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to them. Thus UBPD can complement existing techniques: if phishing
attacks evade earlier detection, then UBPD provides an additional tool
for intervention. There seems little reason to believe UBPD cannot be
effectively combined with other tools.
Finally UBPD focuses on the release of credentials. It is agnostic as to
how the user reached the point of attempted release.
5.6.2 Performance
The two working modes of UBPD reduce the computing complexity.
Detection mode consumes more computing power than training mode,
but it runs only when users are interacting with the websites that are not
contained in the user profile (in our second experiment UBPD only in
detection mode 81 out of 2107 times). Computing in detection mode is still
light weight for the computing power of an average personal computer.
(None of the volunteers noticed any delay.) As a result, UBPD is efficient
to run and adds little delay to the existing user-webpage interaction
experience.
5.6.3 Limitations And Future Work
UBPD should be viewed as an initial but promising effort towards detect-
ing phishing by analysing user behaviour. Despite its detection effective-
ness, there are some limitations within the implementation and design.
These are discussed below.
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Currently UBPD cannot handle all types of authentication credentials.
It can handle static type authentication credentials such as user name,
password, security questions, etc, but dynamic authentication credentials
shared between users and the legitimate websites cannot be handled by
the current implementation (e.g. one-time passwords). In future, it would
be useful to be able to handle such credentials.
There is also another method for a phisher to evade detection. Attackers
might compromise a website within a user’s personal white list and host
the phishing website under the website’s domain (perhaps for several
hours to a couple of days). This method is difficult to carry out, and
it is unlikely to happen if there are still easier ways to launch phishing
attacks.
Detection itself requires little computing time, in fact, retrieving the data
from WHOIS database is the most time consuming part. It depends on
the type of network the user is using and the workload on the WHOIS
database. In future cache functionality could be added to reduce the
number of queries for each detection. Currently the system produces a
slight delay because of the WHOIS database query.
Each user profile contains useful security information, such as the web-
sites the user has binding relationships with. Once deployed, UBPD
is likely to discover active phishing websites at the earliest stages. In
future it would be very interesting to investigate how this information
can be collected safely and used to provide more accurate and timely
detection.
A more thorough and large scale study to compare the detection effect-
iveness of UBPD and other major existing phishing detection tools would
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provide further evidence that the detection by UBPD is more accurate
and can not be affected by the variation of attack techniques.
Improvements to the method to determine the value of the phishing score
threshold could be made. Essentially the idea of having a threshold value
is to alert users when a large portion of their authentication credentials
are about to be shared with third parties. Different user accounts require
different numbers of authentication credentials, so the current approach
to have a universal threshold value may be too sensitive to some accounts
but in the mean time may not be secure enough for others.
One potential approach is to make the threshold value specific to indi-
vidual user accounts, i.e. the threshold value is dependent on the number
of authentication credentials for the phishing attack target. For example
for an account with two authentication credentials this value could be
1.0; and for an account with three authentication credentials this value
can be 0.66. The threshold value can be chosen at the run time based on
the number of authentication credentials the predicted target account has
(UBPD can predict the target of phishing attack based on the credentials
users are about to release).
5.7 Conclusion
Surveys of literature (in chapter 2) revealed that all existing anti-phishing
techniques concentrate on detecting the attack, not on the actual release
of credentials. It is the release of credentials, that is the actual problem.
UBPD focuses on this feature of phishing attacks, and does not rely on
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detection of any specific means by which the user has been persuaded to
release such data(which may take many formats). The detection approach
has unique strength in protecting users from phishing threats, and it also
makes the detection system hard to circumvent. UBPD is not designed to
replace existing techniques. Rather it should be used to complement other
techniques, to provide better overall protection. The detection approach
used in UBPD fills a significant gap in current anti-phishing technology
capability.
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Evaluations and Future Work
6.1 The Hypothesis
This research reported in the previous chapters provides evidence in
support of the following proposition:
A more refined understanding of the nature of deception in
phishing attacks would facilitate more effective user-centred
threat identification of web based authentication systems,
the development of countermeasures to identified threats,
and the production of guidelines for phishing–resilient sys-
tem designs.
Below the achievements of each technical chapter in this thesis are identi-
fied and assessed. The text below also indicates novel aspects of the work
performed.
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6.2 Evaluation
6.2.1 Understanding Of The Nature Of Deception In Phishing Attack
And The Model Of User Phishing Interaction
The research described in Chapter 3 exhibited considerable originality
and achievement in increasing understanding of the nature of deception
in phishing attacks. The following contributions have been made:
Creation of a social engineering attack incident data set. This data set
is the only social engineering attack incident collection on the Internet.
It covers a comprehensive range of attack techniques, attack delivery
channels, technical vulnerabilities exploited, human factors involved, etc.
It can be used for analysing the nature of social engineering attacks and
for other purposes, such as security awareness user education.
Improved understanding and interpretation of phishing attacks from
a decision making point of view. The user’s decision making process
during a phishing attack encounter has been analysed. The user’s ability
to generate better solutions and evaluate available options is found to
be secondary in deciding the outcome of an attack. The most important
factor is how accurate is the perception of the current situation.
Furthermore, we can see that an attacker tries to engineer a false per-
ception within the victim’s mind, and also tries to simplify the solution
generation stage by telling users what actions he/she should take to re-
spond to the false perception. He or she must now decide only whether to
take the suggested means of solving the problem. The suggested actions
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are rational given the false perception.
Creation of a framework for predicting users’ behaviours during phish-
ing encounters. A graphical model to capture the process of user-
phishing interaction and important factors within this process is ab-
stracted. This model focuses on how users construct perceptions and
describes how each important factor could influence an attack outcome.
A systematic answer the question: why do users fall victims to phish-
ing attacks? With reference to the graphical model, this question is
answered comprehensively and in a systematic manner. In contrast, other
research has answered this question in an ad hoc manner (carrying out
user experiments in controlled environments). The answers produced by
my method are more comprehensive.
6.2.2 Guidelines For Phishing Attack Countermeasures
In Chapter 3, based on the improved and refined understanding of phish-
ing attacks, guidelines for designing more usable and effective security
indicators/tools, developing effective security education and evaluating
security indicators/tools were suggested.
6.2.3 Threat Modelling For Web Based User Authentication
Systems
In Chapter 4, a framework and related methods to identify, and assess
user-related vulnerabilities within internet based user authentication
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systems are introduced. This threat modelling method takes an assets-
centric approach and has the following four steps:
1. Asset identification: identify all the valuable assets (authentica-
tion credentials which can be used to prove a user’s identity) that
attackers might obtain from users.
2. Threat Identification: identify threats the authentication creden-
tials (assets) face based on the properties of these authentication
credentials.
3. Vulnerability and risk level assessment: for each threat identified
apply the corresponding vulnerability analysis technique to reveal
the potential vulnerabilities and associated risk levels.
4. Threat mitigation: determine the countermeasures for each vulner-
ability identified.
This technique is designed to be quantifiable, and can be easily integrated
with existing standard vulnerability analyses and risk assessments. Two
cases studies have been used to illustrate how the method should be
applied.
6.2.4 Phishing Websites Detection Tools
The user behaviour based phishing websites detection solution described
in Chapter 5 shows significant novelty. As a previous part of the research
revealed, the construction of a false perception is key to the success of a
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phishing attack. There are two possible approaches to detect attackers’
efforts to engineer a false perception:
• analyse the content of the websites and other relevant incoming
data (from attackers to user victims).
• monitor the occurrence of user behaviours which are the result of
successful phishing attacks.
The latter approach has many advantages. It needs to deal with much
less low level technical detail, has lower maintenance costs, and is funda-
mentally resilient against a variety of attack evasion techniques. It has
been used to develop the phishing websites detection prototype. The eval-
uation of the detection effectiveness has shown that both high detection
and very low false positive rates are achieved.
6.3 Future Work
6.3.1 Refine And Improve The User-Phishing Interaction Model
The user-phishing interaction model was derived from application of
cognitive walkthroughs. A large scale controlled user study and follow on
interviews could be carried out to provide a more rigorous conclusion.
The current model does not describe irrational decision making nor
address influence by other external factors such as emotion, pressure, and
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other human factors. It would be very useful to expand the model to
accommodate these factors.
6.3.2 Study Special User Groups
Current research in human factors in security has not targeted any spe-
cific user group. Many research studies even claim that age, agenda, and
education background have little influence on the results of phishing
attacks. I think it would be interesting to challenge those notions. Chil-
dren, elderly, and disabled user groups are very likely to have distinct
features from the general population, e.g., differences in their perception
of security and privacy, knowledge of information systems, ability to
construct accurate perceptions and give adequate attention to security.
Given their vulnerable nature, research concerning these user groups
is needed. They are obvious ‘soft targets’ for the professional phishers.
They may need specific solutions to protect them from falling victim to
phishing attacks.
6.3.3 Insider Phishing Attacks
In general, attacks from insiders are a common and very serious threat to
information systems. Until now, most reported phishing attacks are from
outsiders. Insiders, who have personal knowledge of and relationships
with victims, can also use phishing attacks to achieve their goals. They can
easily launch speared phishing attacks that are most effective. Research
is needed to determine how one can protect users’ from such threats
without compromising trust among users.
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6.3.4 Usable Authentication Methods
Despite many efforts, there is still a lack of usable, low cost, secure user
authentication methods. Numerous multi-factor and multi-channel au-
thentication methods have been proposed. They often add little security
to the user authentication system, and many of them require substantial
financial investment to implement and deploy, or have operational con-
straints. Also, the usability of these new authentication methods are yet
to be evaluated.
6.3.5 Improving The User Behaviours Based Phishing Website
Detection
The current phishing website detection prototype can detect only phishing
websites that request static authentication credentials such as a password.
It would be useful to research how dynamic authentication credentials,
such as one time passwords, can be securely dealt with.
Another improvement that could be made is to take advantage of a large
collection of individual user profiles. For example, the phishing websites
detected by individual users could be quickly reported, the phishing
websites could be taken down quickly, and a more timely black list could
be built.
Applying this detection approach to detect other social engineering at-
tacks on the Internet is also a possibility.
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6.3.6 Conclusion
Finally, phishing attacks are a major problem. It is important that they are
countered. The work reported in this thesis indicates how understanding
of the nature of phishing may be increased and provides a method to
identify phishing problems in systems. It also contains a prototype of a
system that catches those phishing attacks that evaded other defences, i.e.
those attacks that have “slipped through the net”. An original contribution
has been made in this important field, and the work reported here has
the potential to make the internet world a safer place for a significant
number of people.
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Appendix
A.1 Cognitive Walkthrough Example
As described in chapter 3, the cognitive walkthrough method has been
used to analysing how users make decisions when interacting with phish-
ing attacks. An example of the cognitive walkthrough is provided to help
readers understand how it is performed.
The process of walkthrough has four steps (see details at subsection 3.1.3).
The first three steps are described below, the fourth step is simply to
record the findings and is not described.
A.1.1 Input
There are four aspects of the inputs to be defined. As described in
subsection 3.1.3, users and interfaces are common for each walkthourgh.
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The users are the general public and interfaces are the most common
software tools. (In this case, it is IE7 and Firefox for web browsing,
and Outlook Express for email clients). For this particular walkthrough,
sample tasks (an attacking incident) and action sequences are described
below:
Phishing Attack incident
The targets of this phishing attack are eBay users. The attack engages
users via email in which the embedded URL link could lead users to a
phishing website. The phishing website then harvests users’ authentica-
tion credentials. Sellers on eBay website receive questions from potential
buyers frequently, the attacker in this incident prepared a phishing email
which looks like an automated email sent by Ebay as a result of a buyer’s
question. Below is the screen shot of the phishing email. The attack
was archived by Millersmiles[2], and the incident was reported on 29th
January 2009.
Action Sequence
Since the purpose of the walkthrough is to understand the decision mak-
ing leading to satisfaction of the attacker’s goal, the following sequences
are identified:
• First, the victim reads the header of the email, i.e. the subject title
and sender’s email address.
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Figure A.1: Phishing Email Screen Shot
• Second, the victim reads the content of the email and clicks the link
embedded with the intention of answering the buyer’s question.
• Third, having arrived at the phishing website, the victim finds that
he/she needs to log into their account first. Then he/she types in
their user name and password.
A.1.2 Walkthrough And Analysis
The analysis starts with the first action. For each action the questions
listed in section subsection 3.1.3 are asked.
Questions and Answers for Action One:
• What is the context of the user phishing attack interaction? Answer:
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The victim is an eBay user and is currently selling products on eBay.
• What are the user’s assumptions or expectations? Answer: The
victim anticipates that potential buyers could ask him/her questions
and is expecting to receive question emails from eBay.
• What is the false perception attackers try to engineer? Answer: A
genuine buyer has a question to ask.
• What would be victims’ expected feedback from the user interface
for each action they have taken? Answer: The victim expects the
email client to display the email title and sender’s email address.
The sender’s email address should indicate it is from eBay.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form a false perception? Answer: Both title
and sender’s email address.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form an accurate perception? Answer: None
• Would users know what to do if they wished to determine the
authenticity of the party they are interacting with. If so, is it easy
to perform the check consistently? Answers: Since the user lacks
technical knowledge of the implementation of the email system,
they would not know how to check the authenticity of the sender at
this stage.
Questions and Answers for Action Two:
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• What is the context of the user phishing attack interaction? Answer:
The victim is an Ebay user and is currently selling products on eBay.
• What are the user’s assumptions or expectation? Answer: The
victim expects the content of the email to contain the question from
the buyer regarding the product that the victim is currently selling.
• What is the false perception attackers try to engineer? Answer: A
genuine buyer has a question to ask.
• What would be victims’ expected feedback from the user interface
for each action they have taken? Answer: The victim expects the
email client to display the content of the email; the style and format
of the email should be consistent with the previous email he/she
received from Ebay; the email should address the victim using
his/her user name; there should be a button to respond to the
question immediately.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form a false perception? Answer: The entire
content of the email.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form an accurate perception? Answer: None
• Would users know what to do if they wished to determine the
authenticity of the party they are interacting with. If so, is it easy
to perform the check consistently? Answers: The URL link of
the respond button is http://signin.eBay.com.411-563-829.411-563-829.
j5rljp7hvtzh.hx5rb9vcuhn.info/sc/saw-cgi/eBayISAPI.dll/, which does not
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belong to eBay. However, the user, who lacks technical knowledge
regarding the implementation of the URL naming system, would
not be able to consistently interpret the deceiving URL correctly.
The action to check the URL for the button is also not convenient,
so it may not be performed consistently even if users know how to.
Questions and Answers for Action Three:
• What is the context of the user phishing attack interaction? Answer:
The victim is an Ebay user and is currently selling products on eBay.
• What are the user’s assumptions or expectations? Answer: The
victim expects to visit eBay website and log into their account.
• What is the false perception attackers try to engineer? Answer: A
genuine buyer has a question to ask and the victim now is visiting
the Ebay website.
• What would be victims’ expected feedback from the user interface
for each action they have taken? Answer: The victim expects the
web browser to display the official eBay website.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can
be selected/interpreted to form a false perception? Answer: The
content of the webpage displayed, including its template and style.
• What information obviously available at the user interface can be
selected/interpreted to form an accurate perception? Answer: The
URL address displayed in the URL bar. Note: the lack of certificate
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should not be considered as obviously available, as users are not
good at noticing something missing from the interfaces.
• Would users know what to do if they wished to check the authenti-
city of the counterpart they are interacting with? If so, is it easy to
perform the check consistently? Answers: The same as for Action
Two. The victim lacks the knowledge to do so. To check the URL
address and digital certificate is easy to perform, however, since
there is no enforcement, users may not be able to do this consistently
all the time.
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